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INTRODUCTION

1 the California
Ten years ago, in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories,
Supreme Court created market share liability as a remedy for plaintiffs
who had suffered injuries from prenatal exposure to diethystilbestrol
(DES), but were unable to identify the specific manufacturer of the
drug. The court fashioned the remedy because the available tort theories at the time-enterprise liability, alternate liability, and concert of
action-were inadequate remedies for DES plaintiffs.2 The court's motivation was compensatory: redress innocent plaintiffs' injuries at the
expense of collectively negligent defendants.3 Because of the victims'
inability to show actual causation, the new doctrine sought to approximate a manufacturer's portion of liability for the actual injury suffered
by a DES victim. Sindell apportioned the defendants' damages, therefore, based on their respective share of the relevant market from which
4
the plaintiff's mother most likely had purchased the drug.
Several problems with the Sindell opinion,5 however, took years of
litigation to resolve and caused other jurisdictions to reject Sindell in
favor of their own market-based collective liability regimes.' Only five
states other than California have adopted some version of market share
liability, and each contains drawbacks.7 Virtually no state has applied
market share liability to other areas of tort law mainly because the circumstances surrounding DES have resurfaced in few other products.8
Despite several calls for reform, no legislature has addressed directly
any alternative solution to the problems posed by DES, which leaves to
the courts the burden of compensation."
In 1989 the highest courts of New York and New Jersey revisited
market share liability in the DES context and for recovery for vaccine-

1. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
2. Id. at 598, 607 P.2d at 928, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 136.
3. Id. at 610-11, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
4. Id. at 611-12, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
5. The court failed to define what constitutes a substantial share of the market. Additionally, the decision failed to explain whether courts should use a local or'national market to determine market shares and whether defendants were jointly and severally liable. Id. at 612-13, 607
P.2d at 937-38, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145-46; see infra notes 48, 56-58 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 78-79, 112 and accompanying text.
7. See infra note 132; see also infra subpart VI(A). Despite its shortcomings, however, market share liability remains the only remedy for DES victims who cannot link their injuries to a
specific DES manufacturer.
8. See infra Part V.
9. See infra note 333.
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related injuries. Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co. 10 allowed a market share
cause of action for New York DES victims and instituted an innovative
variation of the original Sindell doctrine. Shackil v. Lederle Laboratories" rejected market share liability for vaccine victims and endorsed
the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act 2 as the most appropriate
solution to the vaccine problem. Together, these two cases illustrate the
continued vitality of market share liability in DES cases and the consistent rejection of the doctrine elsewhere in the torts system.
Part II of this Note provides a brief overview of DES. Part III discusses the creation of market share liability in California. Part IV
tracks the development of the doctrine in other jurisdictions within the
context of DES litigation. Part V reviews the application of market
share liability to other products liability cases. Part VI presents
Hymowitz and analyzes the New York court's contribution to market
share liability jurisprudence. Part VI also analyzes Shackil and the application of market share liability to vaccine injuries. Finally, Part VII
reviews the problems posed by market share liability and proposes a
legislative solution modeled after the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act. This Note concludes that market share liability is an appropriate solution to the situation presented by DES; indeed, it is the only
solution. The inherent limitations of the doctrine, however, and the
burden it imposes on judicial resources suggest that the legislature can
handle best the undertaking for which market share liability was
designed and the required balance between compensation and societal
concerns.

II. DES

BACKGROUND

DES is a synthetic estrogen discovered by a group of British scientists in the 1930s.13 In 1947 the Federal Drug Administration (FDA)
approved DES for use in preventing morning sickness and miscarriages. 14 DES never was patented and consists of a generic chemical
compound.' 5 Hence, during the twenty-four years that DES remained
on the market, approximately three hundred different companies manufactured and distributed the drug according to its generic formula, and
10.
11.

73 N.Y.2d 487, 539 N.E.2d 1069, 541 N.Y.S.2d 941, cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 350 (1989).
116 N.J. 155, 561 A.2d 511 (1989). For a discussion of Hymowitz, see infra subpart VI(A).

For a discussion of Shackil, see infra subpart VI(B).
12.

42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1 to 300aa-34 (1988).

13. Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 173 Ill. App. 3d 1, 9, 527 N.E.2d 333, 338 (1988), rev'd, 137 Ill.
2d 222, 560 N.E.2d 324 (1990).

14. 173 Mll.App. 3d at 10, 527 N.E.2d at 338.
15.

Martin v. Abbott Laboratories, 102 Wash. 2d 581, 587, 689 P.2d 368, 373 (1984).
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many of these companies marketed DES generically.' 6 The FDA prohibited use of DES for pregnancy-related complications in 1971, but by
this time about three million pregnant women already had taken the
17
drug.
DES injuries generally have been limited to women whose mothers
used DES during pregnancy.' 8 These victims typically suffer from adenocarcinoma-cancer of the vagina, cervix, or uterus. 19 Because the latency period of adenocarcinoma is ten to twenty years, 20 by the time a
plaintiff had become aware of her injuries, physicians, pharmacies, and
manufacturers had discarded most of their records. 21 This lack of
records, combined with the number of DES manufacturers, the generic
appearance of the drug, and the latency period between exposure and
injury, made the plaintiff's duty of identifying the culpable manufacturer virtually impossible. 22 DES victims, therefore, were unable to allege the requisite elements of a traditional tort claim and were forced to
bear their injuries without a remedy.23
III.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF MARKET SHARE LIABILITY IN CALIFORNIA

A.

Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories

At the time that Judith Sindell filed suit against Abbott Laboratories and ten other drug companies, only two DES plaintiffs had reached
16. Smith, 173 Ill. App. 3d at 11, 527 N.E.2d at 339.
17. See Comment, DES and a Proposed Theory of EnterpriseLiability, 46 FORDHAm L. REv.
963, 964-66 & n.6 (1978). Containing a thorough discussion on the historical development of DES,
this Comment was the first law review article advocating the use of a market share formula and
served as a catalyst for the Sindell decision. For another review of the history of DES, see
Schwartz & Mahshigian, Failure to Identify the Defendant in Tort Law: Towards a Legislative
Solution, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 941, 943-45 (1985).
18. See Case Comment, Refining Market Share Liability: Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 33
STAN. L. REV. 937, 937 & n.3 (1981) (stating that although DES has been linked to genital tract
injuries in both sexes, women between the ages of 14 and 23 are the most frequent victims).
19. See Comment, supra note 17, at 965 & nn.6-10 (stating that epidemiological studies have
linked prenatal exposure to DES with the presence of rare forms of cancer of the vagina and that
as many as 3 million women may have taken DES for use during pregnancy).
20. Smith, 173 Ill. App. 3d at 11 n.8, 527 N.E.2d at 339 n.8 (citing Biebel, DES Litigation
and the Problem of Causation,51 INS. CouNs. J. 223, 227 (1984)).
21. See id. at 11, 527 N.E.2d at 339.
22. See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 600-01, 607 P.2d 924, 930, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 132, 139, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980). Paradoxically, courts created market share liability because of the unique facts surrounding DES. Yet the very uniqueness of these facts has limited the doctrine considerably. Because similarly unique facts have yet to surface in products
liability law, the doctrine lies dormant outside the DES context. See infra Part V.
23. See Case Comment, supra note 18, at 937 & n.1 (stating that "[u]nder traditional tort
law, plaintiffs are required to match the cause of their harms to a particular defendant"). See
generally W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 41 (5th
ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON]; Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CALrF. L. REV. 1737
(1985).
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the merits of their claims successfully.24 The remaining judgments favored defendants, and many of these dispositions were made on pretrial
motions. 25 Plaintiffs in these cases could not overcome one of the fundamental elements of causation: proving that their injuries were the result of the defendants' acts.26 The dilemma of identifying the
manufacturer of the drug her mother used also confronted Judith
Sindell. She presented three main arguments based on existing tort
doctrines, and all three were rejected."'
Sindell first sought recovery under the theory of alternate liability,
which she based on Summers v. Tice. Summers held that when two or
more defendants breach a duty to the plaintiff, but the plaintiff cannot
show which defendant actually caused the injury, the burden of proof
shifts to the defendants to prove their innocence.2 9 The court in
Sindell, however, refused to apply the Summers holding for two reasons. First, the drug manufacturers were in no better position than the
plaintiff to identify the producer of the DES taken by the plaintiff's
mother.30 Second, having two hundred to three hundred possibly culpable defendants made it very difficult, if not impossible, to determine
whether any of the defendants before the court actually harmed the
plaintiff."' By contrast, Summers joined both of the two possible defendants, creating a fifty percent chance that either one of them caused
32
the plaintiff's injury.
Sindell's second theory was based on concerted action between the
drug manufacturers. Concert of action allows joint and several recovery
24. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 594, 597 & n.7, 607 P.2d at 925, 927 & n.7, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 133,
135 & n.7. At the time of Sindell, the two exceptions were Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 55 N.Y.2d
571, 436 N.E.2d 182, 450 N.Y.S.2d 776 (1982) (allowing plaintiff to proceed under a concerted
action theory), and Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 418 Mich. 311, 343 N.W.2d 164 (1984) (allowing the
plaintiff to proceed under alternate liability). For a discussion of Bichler, see infra note 215. For a
discussion of Abel, see infra notes 125-31 and accompanying text.
25. See Robinson, Multiple Causation in Tort Law: Reflections on the DES Cases, 68 VA. L.
Rav. 713, 719 & n.23 (1982) (citing several cases that granted dismissals or summary judgments).
26. See supra note 23. See generally Note, Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories: A Market Share
Approach to DES Causation,69 CAnn,. L. REv. 1179 (1981).
27. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 598, 607 P.2d at 928, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 136.
28. 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948).
29. Id. at 86-87, 199 P.2d at 4.
30. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 602, 607 P.2d at 930, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 138. Part of the Summers
rationale of shifting the burden to the defendants is that the defendants are in a better position
than the plaintiffs to identify the actual wrongdoer.
31. Id. at 602-03, 607 P.2d at 931, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 139.
32. Id. at 602, 607 P.2d at 931, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 139. In Summers a bullet negligently fired
by one of two hunters injured the plaintiff. The plaintiff was unable to prove, however, which
hunter fired the shot causing the injury. Both defendants were negligent, but only one actually
caused the plaintiff's harm. Nevertheless, the court held both defendants jointly and severally liable and shifted to the defendants the burden of apportioning damages. See Summers, 33 Cal. 2d at
80, 199 P.2d at 1.
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from all defendants expressly or tacitly committing a tortious act with a
common plan or design. ss Sindell argued that the defendants failed to
test DES adequately and to provide sufficient warnings about the
drug's dangers. She argued also that the manufacturers acted in concert
because they produced DES from a common formula.3 4 The court rejected this argument, finding that the defendants had no tacit understanding or common plan to omit tests and warnings. 5 At most, the
defendants may have acted in parallel to one another regarding testing
and marketing, but such parallel action was standard practice in the
industry. 6 The court feared that allowing a concert of action claim in
Judith Sindell's case would expand liability beyond the doctrine's intended scope and could result in holding a defendant liable for the de37
fective products of an entire industry.
Finally, the court considered Sindell's enterprise liability argument.
Enterprise liability rests on the defendant's adherence to an industrywide safety standard and cooperation in the manufacture or design of a
defective product.3 " Under this theory, defendants jointly control the
risk; a showing that one of the manufacturers made the defective product shifts the burden of proof to all of the defendants. After noting
that enterprise liability was recommended for industries consisting of
small numbers of defendants, the court in Sindell rejected the theory
because of the large number of DES manufacturers, the absence of any
delegation of duty to a trade association, and the drug industry requirement of FDA approval.4 0
Having exhausted the existing remedies,4 1 the court created market
33. Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 73 N.Y.2d 487, 506, 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1074, 541 N.Y.S.2d
941, 946, cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 350 (1989); PROSSER & KETON, supra note 23, § 52, at 346
(stating that when "two or more persons act in concert, it is well settled ... that each will be
liable for the entire result"). The classic example of concerted action is a drag race in which two
drivers act with the same plan or design that results in an injury. Both drivers would be held
jointly and severally liable for the injury. PROSSER & KFEON, supra note 23, § 46, at 322-24.
34. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 605, 607 P.2d at 932, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 140.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 605, 607 P.2d at 933, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 141.
37. Id.
38. See Hall v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 376-78 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
In Hall blasting caps injured 13 children in 10 different states, and the court held one manufacturer jointly and severally liable for the negligence of the entire industry. The negligence stemmed
from the industry standard of failing to place a warning on the blasting caps. See id. at 378; see
also PROSSER & KEnTON, supra note 23, § 72 (discussing joint enterprises).
39. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 608, 607 P.2d at 934, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 142.
40. Id. at 609-10, 607 P.2d at 935, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144. The court in Hall recommended
limiting enterprise liability to industries with few manufacturers. Hall, 345 F. Supp. at 378.
41. See Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 610, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144. The court noted
that either confining the plaintiff to Summers or Hall or requiring the plaintiff to show concert of
action would have forced the dismissal of the lawsuit.

1991]

MARKET SHARE LIABILITY

share liability based on a modification of Summers v. Tice alternate
liability.4 The court partly relied on the flexibility of the common-law
torts system to accommodate new causes of action in compelling cases
like those presented by DES.43 The court noted also that one of the
comments in the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides for modification of the Summers rule.4 4 Most important, however, the court reiterated the compensation-oriented philosophy of Summers: between
negligent defendants and an innocent plaintiff, the former should carry
the cost of the injury. 46 An undiluted Summers rationale was inadequate, however, because the court could not ascertain with reasonable
certainty that any of the defendants before the court actually were culpable. By apportioning liability solely between the joined defendants, a
significant chance existed that the culpable manufacturer would escape
liability. 4e Thus, the court allocated liability according to the percent-

age of DES sold by each defendant for pregnancy-related uses in relation to the entire production of the drug sold by all defendants for this
purpose. 47 The court required the plaintiff to join a "substantial share"
42. Id. at 610-13, 607 P.2d at 936-38, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144-46. The court found that when
defendants produced an identical drug and plaintiffs, through no fault of their own, could not
identify the particular defendant, a modification of Summers was warranted.
43. Citing Justice Roger Traynor's opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d
453, 467-68, 150 P.2d 436 (1944), the court stated that "in an era of mass production and complex
marketing methods the traditional standard of negligence was insufficient to govern the obligations
of manufacturer to consumer, so should we acknowledge that some adaptation of the rules of causation and liability may be appropriate in these recurring circumstances." Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at
610, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
44. Sindell, 26 Cal. 2d at 610, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144 (citing RESTATEmENT
(SzcoND) oF TORTS § 433B comment h (1977)). The comment states that it "is possible that cases
may arise in which some modification of the rule stated may be necessary because of complications
arising from the fact that one of the actors involved is or cannot be joined as a defendant, or
because of the effect of lapse of time." RESTATEMENT (SzcoND) OF TORTS, supra, § 433B comment
h.
45. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 610-11, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144. The court stated that
the "most persuasive reason for finding plaintiff states a cause of action is that advanced in Summers: as between an innocent plaintiff and negligent defendants, the latter should bear the cost of
the injury." Id. From an economic standpoint this argument is sound because the most efficient
cost bearer, the manufacturer, bears the risk. See Calabresi & Klevorick, Four Tests for Liability
in Torts, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 585 (1985).
46. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text. Summers was devised to place the burden
of disproving causation on a small group of defendants. The smaller the group, the greater the
chance that one of the defendants actually caused the harm. In Sindell only 5 defendants were
joined out of a possible 200 to 300. Thus, the court found little mathematical certainty that any
defendant in the action actually harmed the plaintiff and a strong likelihood that the culpable
manufacturer would escape liability. See Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 610-13, 607 P.2d at 936-38, 163 Cal.
Rptr. at 144-46. For a discussion of alternate liability within the DES context, see Fischer, Products Liability-An Analysis of Market Share Liability, 34 VAND. L. REv. 1623, 1630-35 (1981);
Robinson, supra note 25, at 724-25; Note, Market Share Liability. An Answer to the DES Causation Problem, 94 HARv. L. REv. 668, 671-72 (1981).
47. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 611-13, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. The court used each
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of DES manufacturers before it would shift the burden to the defendants to prove affirmatively that they did not make the product that injured the particular plaintiff.48
The court supported its theory on several grounds. First, requiring
the plaintiff to join a substantial share of manufacturers diminishes the
injustice of shifting the burden to the defendants by accounting for
more of the market and increasing the likelihood of joining the responsible manufacturer.4" The court reasoned also that allowing defendants
both to exculpate themselves and to join other possibly negligent defendants further refines causal responsibility.50 The court concluded
that its approach would allocate liability in approximation to the harm
caused by the product if the plaintiff had been able to identify the defendant .5e Thus, the court attempted to link liability with culpability,
while dispensing with the insurmountable identification requirement.
Admittedly, this approach satisfies causation with approximations
rather than the theoretical certainty that causation normally requires. 2
The court noted, however, that juries always have faced difficulty in
apportioning damages under comparative negligence and partial indemnity schemes."' The court's rationale again came from Summers: if a
jury cannot apportion liability with exactitude, it simply must do the
best it can. 4
Although theoretically innovative, the Sindell approach contains
several practical shortcomings. The court neglected to explain fully the
defendant's share of the market to apportion damages. Id. To overcome the identification problem,
the court eliminated the requirement of individual causation. Sindell, however, did not change the
standard of proof that a plaintiff must satisfy to recover. Robinson, supra note 25, at 727. A plaintiff still must show that the defendant's product was defective and that the plaintiff's injuries
proximately resulted therefrom. Thus, only the identification element is relaxed. Id. at 727-28.
48. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. The court designed the
substantial share requirement to minimize the injustice of shifting the burden of proof to the defendants by ensuring that an adequate representation of the market was before the court. The
court never defined the required percentage precisely, but stated that it is less than 75 to 80%. See
id. One commentator has suggested that the court meant substantially more than 50% of the market. See Robinson, supra note 25, at 725 n.53.
49. See Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
50. See id.
51.

Id.

52. See id. The court noted that some discrepancy between a defendant's market share and
liability is inevitable and that some defendants may have to pay more than their actual share of
the market. The court concluded, however, that juries always have faced difficulty in apportioning
damages under comparative negligence and partial indemnity schemes and that any discrepancies
do not "seriously militate against the rule" adopted by the court. Id. at 613, 607 P.2d at 937, 163
Cal. Rptr. at 145.
53. Id.

54. The court stated that when "a correct division of liability cannot be made, 'the trier of
fact may make it the best it can.'" Id. (quoting Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 88, 199 P.2d 1, 5
(1948)).
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requirement of joining a "substantial share" of the market. 5 The court5
merely dismissed the issue of market definition as a matter of proof,
which has engendered substantial debate.5 The biggest unanswered
question of the Sindell decision, however, was whether the defendants
would be held jointly and severally liable. Sindell ignored55 this issue,
which remained unresolved until Brown v. Superior Court.
B.

Brown v. Superior Court

Brown, rendered seven years after market share liability was introduced in Sindell, finally resolved whether courts following Sindell
should hold defendants jointly or severally liable.5 9 Brown held that
DES manufacturers in market share liability would be held severally
liable only.6 0 As the court noted, the two forms of liability yield substantially different results. A holding of joint liability assures plaintiffs
a one hundred percent recovery from any one of the solvent defendants
joined by a plaintiff under the substantial share requirement.6 1 The
court determined that this approach saddled defendants with the burden of paying more than their market share in the event that any one
or more of the defendants before the court were insolvent, or that a
potential defendant was not joined in the action.6 2 In contrast, the sev55. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
56. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 613, 607 P.2d at 937-38, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145-46. The court provided: "We are not unmindful of the practical problems involved in defining the market and determining market share, but these are largely matters of proof which properly cannot be determined
at the pleading stage of these proceedings." Id. (footnote omitted).
57. See, e.g., Fischer, supra note 46, at 1642-45; Schwartz & Mahshigian, supra note 17, at
956-60; Note, supra note 26, at 1189-93; Comment, The Market Share Theory: Sindell's Contribution to Industry-Wide Liability, 19 Hous. L. Rav. 107, 128-32 (1981).
58. 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 751 P.2d 470, 245 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1988). If Sindell expressly had resolved
the joint liability problem, more courts might have adopted the Sindell model.
59. Brown was a complex litigation action involving approximately 70 plaintiffs who had
been exposed prenatally to DES. The plaintiffs brought action under the theories of strict liability,
breach of express and implied warranty, fraud, and negligence. Brown, 44 Cal. 3d at 1055, 751 P.2d
at 473, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 414-15.
For a general discussion of joint and several liability, see PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 23, §
47, at 327-28 (providing that "[w]hen joinder is permitted, it is not compelled, and each tortfeasor
may be sued severally, and held responsible for the damage caused, although other wrongdoers
have contributed to it," and that "[s]ince each is severally liable, a verdict in favor of one will not
discharge the others").
60. Brown, 44 Cal. 3d at 1075, 751 P.2d at 486-87, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 428. The court held also
that DES manufacturers were not strictly liable for design defects, that market share liability cannot be used with fraud or breach of warranty claims, that comment k of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts applies to all prescription drugs not simply to those that are found to be "unavoidably
dangerous," and that a manufacturer's standard of knowledge for failure to warn of danger is what
was known or should have been known at the time the drug was distributed. Id. at 1061-72, 751
P.2d at 477-84, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 418-26.
61. Id. at 1072, 751 P.2d at 485, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 426.
62. Id. at 1075, 751 P.2d at 486-87, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 428.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:395

eral liability approach apportions damages in a pro rata fashion according to each defendant's market share.63 Thus, the percentage of the
plaintiff's award is limited to the actual market share represented by
the defendants joined in the action. Under this approach the plaintiff,
rather, than the defendant, bears the financial burden if any of the
joined defendants are insolvent or if a potentially liable defendant was
not joined at all."
The court in Brown found that even though Sindell did not address joint and several liability directly, it contained support for both
plaintiffs' and defendants' arguments.6 5 In response to the plaintiffs' assertions, the court found that Sindell's failure to discuss this point did
not imply a holding in favor of joint and several liability." The court
equally was unpersuaded that the theory of market share liability required a finding of joint and several liability and that without this find67
ing a defendant would have no incentive to join other defendants.
The court based its holding of several liability on the policy reasons
for market share liability. The court characterized market share liability as a compromise that allows a plaintiff to proceed with an action
without showing specific causation at the expense of holding some innowas concerned about burcent defendants liable.6 8 The court, however,
69
dening defendants with excessive liability.
The court explained that market share liability's objective is to approximate reasonably the defendant's portion of the plaintiff's injuries
by bringing to court a substantial number of DES manufacturers and
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1072-73, 751 P.2d at 485, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 426. The question of allocating this
financial burden bears directly on the apportionment of damages and the amount of plaintiff's

award because, as the Sindell court noted, that all of the manufacturers in the relevant market
could be brought to court is unlikely. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 610, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at
144. The Brown court noted that the plaintiff would recover an entire judgment only "in the unlikely event that all manufacturers were [solvent and] joined in the action." Brown, 44 Cal. 3d at
1072, 751 P.2d at 485, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 426.

65. Brown, 44 Cal. 3d at 1072-75, 751 P.2d at 485-87, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 426-28; see Case
Comment, supra note 18, at 941-42 (analyzing the two possible interpretations of Sindell).
66. Brown, 44 Cal. 3d at 1073, 751 P.2d at 485, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 427. The court stated that
"[tihe question of joint liability was not considered in Sindell, and this omission should not be
read as an implied holding in favor of such a rule." Id.
67. Id. at 1074, 751 P.2d at 486, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 427. The court enunciated three reasons
why a defendant would be inclined to join other defendants despite a holding of several liability:
[A] defendant might desire to show that another producer made the DES that caused the
injury; the presence in the action of additional defendants might assist in providing a more
complete picture of the relevant market, thereby possibly diluting a defendant's ultimate liability; or the addition of another defendant could assist with the burden of defending the
action.

68.
69.

See id.
See id. at 1075, 751 P.2d at 486, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 428.
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requiring them to prove that they did not harm the plaintiff.70 To comply with this objective the court must try to avoid holding defendants
liable for injuries caused by another manufacturer's product and must
try to ascribe liability according to the market instead of the small
group of defendants joined in the action.7 1 A holding of joint liability,
however, contradicts market share liability because a financially sound
defendant could be required to pay a plaintiff's entire judgment, an
amount wholly irrelevant to its percentage of the market.7 2 Finally,
Brown rejected the plaintiff's suggestion that the court should inflate a
defendant's liability in proportion to its market share to allow full recovery. 73 This novel approach, the court reasoned, also was inconsistent
74
with the objective of closely approximating defendant's liability.
IV.

A.

OTHER APPROACHES

Market Share Alternate Liability

75
1. Martin v. Abbott Laboratories

In 1984 the Washington Supreme Court in Martin v. Abbott Laboratories followed Sindell's initiative and allowed a DES cause of action
for plaintiffs who could not identify the specific negligent manufacturer.7 8 The court in Martin, however, expressly rejected Sindell's approach and created its own solution entitled "market share alternate
liability."' 7 7 Although agreeing that Sindell introduced an attractive
concept,78 the court in Martin found that the framework in Sindell in70. Id.
71. See id.
72. See Fischer, supra note 46, at 1646 (explaining the "inherent distortion" of joint and
several liability). Joint liability would apportion damages according to a defendant's solvency
rather than its approximate responsibility for the plaintiff's injuries. The court's finding of several
liability is consistent with the views of some commentators. See, e.g., Schwartz & Mahshigian,
supra note 17, at 957; Note, supra note 26, at 1194; Note, supra note 46, at 673; Comment, supra
note 57, at 131-32.
73. Brown, 44 Cal. 3d at 1075, 751 P.2d at 487, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 428.
74. The court stated that although inflating a defendant's damages was not as severe as joint
and several liability, it was still a retreat from the objective of achieving the closest approximation
of a defendant's liability based on the amount of DES produced. Id.
75. 102 Wash. 2d 581, 689 P.2d 368 (1984).
76. Id. For a general overview of Martin, see Comment, Into the Quagmire: Washington
Adopts Market Share Liability in DES Cases, 21 GONZAGA L. REv. 199 (1985).
77. Martin, 102 Wash. 2d at 602, 689 P.2d at 381. Aptly named, market share alternate liability, like Summers, joins a certain group of defendants, but the system ultimately attempts to
apportion damages according to market share and, thus, is a hybrid of Summers and Sindell.
78. Id. at 601, 689 P.2d at 380; see also Comment, supra note 76, at 226. Like Sindell, Martin rejected concert of action, enterprise, and the unmodified version of alternate liability and
found support for creating a new remedy in the Summers rationale of placing the burden of the
injury on defendants. Martin, 102 Wash. 2d at 591-601, 689 P.2d at 375-80.
The court also found support in comment h of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433B(3),
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herently distorted liability by conferring joint and several liability on
the defendants.7 9 This finding in Martin highlights the gravity of
Sindell's failure to address joint and several liability and to define, what
constitutes a substantial share of the market because the relative distortion in the defendant's liability depends on the percentage of the
market that is joined in the case. s0
Martin devised its own solution to the DES dilemma. First, in contrast to the substantial share requirement, the court held that a plaintiff only need commence suit against one defendant."e Defendants can
exculpate themselves from liability by showing by a preponderance of
the evidence that their products did not reach the plaintiff.8 2 The remaining defendants form the plaintiff's DES market and are presumed
to have equal shares unless a defendant can prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that its share of the market was less than its presumptive share.8 3 If a defendant can make this showing, its presumptive
share is reduced accordingly. 4 The defendants unable to prove their
share of the market must increase their liability to account for one hundred percent of the market.8 5 If each defendant can carry the burden of
proving its share and the resulting market is less than one hundred percent, the plaintiff's judgment is reduced accordingly." Only under this
which states that "[t]he [alternate liability] rule stated in Subsection (3) is not intended to preclude possible modification if such situations call for it." Id. at 604, 689 P.2d at 382.
79. Martin, 102 Wash. 2d at 601-02, 689 P.2d at 380-81; see also supra text accompanying
note 72. The Brown decision showed that the court's concern about the possibility of Sindell providing for joint and several liability was unfounded. See supra notes 60-67 and accompanying text.
80. See Fischer, supra note 46, at 1645-46; Comment, supra note 76, at 228.
81. Martin, 102 Wash. 2d at 604, 689 P.2d at 382. For a discussion of the remaining elements
of a plaintiff's suit, see Comment, supra note 76, at 227-29.
82. Martin, 102 Wash. 2d at 605, 689 P.2d at 382; cf. George v. Parke-Davis, 107 Wash. 2d
584, 733 P.2d 507 (1987). Parke-Davisprohibited defendants from attempting to reduce their presumptive share by impleading a defendant that is not amenable to suit and whose share of the
market cannot be calculated. 107 Wash. 2d at 596, 733 P.2d at 514. Parke-Davis also resolved the
issue of defining the relevant market, which was left open by the court in Martin. The court in
Parke-Davis opted to define the market as narrowly as the evidence permits. The court recognized,
however, that each case will present a different quantum of evidence. Thus, although the court
favored a local market, "other figures, such as distribution figures within the county, state, or even
the country may in certain circumstances be introduced." Id. at 592, 733 P.2d at 512.
83. Martin, 102 Wash. 2d at 605, 689 P.2d at 383.
84. Id. at 605-06, 689 P.2d at 383.
85. Id. at 606, 689 P.2d at 383. This requirement is similar to the liability inflation suggested
by the plaintiffs, but rejected by the court, in Brown. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying
text.
86. See Martin, 102 Wash. 2d at 606, 689 P.2d at 383. For the plaintiff to receive less than
full recovery, each defendant must prove its market share to avoid paying the pro rata amount.
The court noted that the theory enhances liability because, by eliminating individual causation,
plaintiffs can recover without having to identify the defendant. According to the court, the approach also limits liability, however, because defendants can dilute responsibility by joining other
defendants. Id.
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unlikely situation will a defendant avoid paying more than its statistical
share of the market requires.8 7 Thus, the court in Martin overcame its
greatest objection to Sindell-holding defendants liable for more than
their market share-but only if all the defendants meet their burden of
proof.88
2.

Further Application of Martin

a. Massachusetts
The modified alternate liability theory devised by the Supreme
Court of Washington in Martin has received the most widespread acceptance of any solution to the DES problem. 9 In 1985 the United
States District Court in Massachusetts adopted the Martin approach
verbatim in McCormack v. Abbott Laboratories." The district court
concluded that of the then existing options, the framework in Martin
was most consistent with the concerns set forth by the Massachusetts
9 1 Agreeing that
Supreme Court in Payton v. Abbott Laboratories.
some
relaxation of causation may be warranted under the right set of facts,
the court still was convinced that a joint recovery method was excessive
because it holds defendants liable for more than their market share. 2
Additionally, the court favored a system that allowed defendants to exculpate themselves to limit liability in cases with insolvent defendants.93 The court concluded that the Martin approach best facilitated
the goal of holding defendants liable according to their negligence,
while still providing plaintiffs with a method to overcome the identification obstacle.9
87. That all defendants could carry their burden of going forward with the market information is unlikely because of the lack of adequate records.
88. Although the court avoided what it perceived to be outright joint liability in Sindell, it
still provided for inflation of damages if defendants cannot rebut the presumption of its pro rata
share of the market. Thus, some defendants quite possibly will bear a greater percentage of the
plaintiff's award than their market shares represent.
89. Courts in Massachusetts and Florida also have adopted the Martin approach. See, e.g.,
McCormack v. Abbott Laboratories, 617 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Mass. 1985); Conley v. Boyle Drug Co.,
No. 67,626 (Fla. Nov. 1, 1990) (LEXIS, States library, Fla. file). Arguably, the only jurisdiction to
adopt Sindell in a DES case is South Dakota in McElhaney v. Eli Lilly & Co., 564 F. Supp. 265
(D.S.D. 1983). One commentator has stated that the South Dakota opinion does not amount to a
following because the opinion is brief and was written by a federal district court judge. See Comment, supra note 76, at 226.
90. 617 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Mass. 1985).
91. 386 Mass. 540, 573, 437 N.E.2d 171, 189-90 (1982); see Martin, 617 F. Supp.'at 1526. In
Payton the Massachusetts Supreme Court declined to adopt market share liability in the DES
context, but expressed its views on market share. The court favored a system that would not hold
defendants jointly and severally liable and stated that all defendants should be given the opportunity to exculpate themselves to ensure that defendants innocent of wrongdoing to a particular
plaintiff would not be held liable. Payton, 386 Mass. at 573-74, 437 N.E.2d at 189-90.
92. See McCormack, 617 F. Supp. at 1525-27.
93. See id.
94. See id. at 1526-28.
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b. Florida
Recently, in Conley v. Boyle Drug Co.,95 Florida also adopted Mar-

tin's market share alternate liability theory. The Florida Supreme
Court rejected the drug manufacturers' argument that the legislature
must initiate such a drastic departure from traditional tort law." Instead, the court emphasized its continuing duty to modify tort law and
maintain a fair system in light of societal and technological change. 7
The court in Conley viewed Martin as a starting point only, however,
and discussed several modifications proposed by the lower court.98
The supreme court rejected the lower court's suggestion that the
defendants' geographic market should encompass the entire state of
Florida.99 Rather, the court chose to define the relevant market as narrowly as the evidence would permit in each case. 100 The court reasoned
that the narrowest possible market is most consistent with the theory
behind Martin.01° The court rejected also the lower court's proposal of
95. No. 67,626 at 1.
96. See id. at 20.
97. The court stated: "This court has consistently recognized its 'continuing responsibility
to the citizens of this state' to modernize traditional principles of tort law when such becomes
necessary 'to ensure that the law remains both fair and realistic as society and technology
change.'" Id. (quoting Insurance Co. of North America v. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d 447, 451 (Fla.
1984)).
98. Id. The Florida Supreme Court addressed the issue of market share liability in response
to a 1985 certified question posed by the district court of appeals. The supreme court responded
affirmatively to the following inquiry- "Does Florida recognize a cause of action against a defendant for marketing defective DES when the plaintiff admittedly cannot establish that a particular
defendant was responsible for the injury?" Conley v. Boyle Drug Co., 477 So. 2d 600, 607-08 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1985); see also Conley, No. 67,626, at 2-3.
99. Conley, No. 67,626, at 21-22.
100. Id. at 21. Thus, depending on the evidence, the relevant market could be a pharmacy, a
county, or a state. Id. By citing George v. Parke-Davis, 107 Wash. 2d 584, 592, 733 P.2d 507, 512
(1987), see supra note 82, the court implied that even a national market could be appropriate if
required by the evidence. By the same reference, the court also apparently relegated the choice of
marketplace to the trial court, which "is in the best position to decide in each case whether the
national or regional figures are a good approximation for the relevant geographic market." Conley,
No. 67,626, at 22 n.12 (quoting Parke-Davis, 107 Wash. 2d at 592-93, 733 P.2d at 512).
101. See Conley, No. 67,626 at 21-22. The court based its conclusion on two points. First, the
court agreed with Parke-Davis, see supra note 82, that the narrowest possible market facilitates
exculpation by defendants able to prove their product was not distributed in that market. Second,
the court asserted that a narrow market advances the overall goal of market share liability. imposing liability "only on those drug companies who could have manufactured the DES which caused
the plaintiff's injuries." Conley, No. 67,626, at 21-22 (citing Parke-Davis,107 Wash. 2d at 592, 733
P.2d at 512); cf. Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 73 N.Y.2d 487, 539 N.E.2d 1069, 541 N.Y.S.2d 941,
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 350 (1989) (advocating use of a national market); Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
137 Ill. 2d 222, 560 N.E.2d 324 (1990) (discussing the difficulty experienced by a trial California
court with local market and reversion to national market); infra note 147; infra notes 228-34 and

1991]

MARKET SHARE LIABILITY

joint and several liability'0 2 for essentially the same reasons presented
in Brown v. Superior Court.0s
The court in Conley accepted the lower court's recommendation
that a plaintiff must make a due diligence effort to identify the responsible manufacturer as a prerequisite to recovery.10 4 In support of this
requirement, the court noted several cases in which DES plaintiffs had
identified the specific'defendant, thus rendering market share liability
unnecessary. 0 5 Like Martin, Conley permits defendants to exculpate
themselves from liability. 0 6 Also like Martin, defendants unable to exculpate themselves face a rebuttable presumption that they have equal
shares of the market. 0 7 Although defendants can reduce their presumptive shares by impleading third-party defendants, the court will permit
impleader only when actual market share statistics are available for the
third-party defendants. 0 8
B.

The Wisconsin Approach: Risk Contribution

About the same time that the Washington Supreme Court adopted
market share alternate liability, the Wisconsin Supreme Court overaccompanying text.
102. Conley, No. 67,626, at 23. The lower court proposed to hold joined defendants unable to
exonerate themselves jointly and severally liable.
103. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text. The court noted also that Florida permits joint and several liability only in limited circumstances. Conley, No. 67,626, at 24-25.
104. Conley, No. 67,626, at 26. The court characterized market share liability as a remedy of
last resort to be used only when the plaintiff cannot identify the defendant. Id. (citing Celotex
Corp. v. Copeland, 471 So. 2d 533, 537 (Fla. 1985)). For a discussion of applying a due diligence
requirement to DES, see Note, The Application of a Due Diligence Requirement in DES Litigation, 19 J.L. REFORM 771, 782-83 (1986) (arguing that a due diligence requirement is needed as an
incentive for plaintiffs to identify the responsible defendant).
105. See cases cited at Conley, No. 67,626, at 26-27. The court listed five elements necessary
for a market share action:
1) that [the plaintiff] has made a reasonable attempt to identify the manufacturer responsible for her injury; 2) that [the plaintiff's] mother ingested DES during the pregnancy which
resulted in the plaintiff's birth; 3) that DES caused the plaintiff's subsequent injuries; 4) that
the defendant or defendants produced or marketed the type of DES taken by the plaintiff's
mother; and 5) that the defendant or defendants acted negligently in producing or marketing
the DES.
Id. at 28.
106. Id. at 29; see supra notes 82-87 and accompanying text.
107. Conley, No. 67,626, at 29; see supra note 83 and accompanying text.
108. Conley, No. 67,626, at 30. The court's requirement that defendants who implead third
parties bear the burden of proving the actual market shares for impleaded manufacturers is
designed to prevent defendants from diluting presumptive shares by joining insolvent or defunct
corporations. The court's opinion is unclear, however, about whether a defunct manufacturer can
be joined if market share statistics are available for that manufacturer. Cf. Parke-Davis,107 Wash.
2d at 596, 733 P.2d at 514, discussed supra note 82 (allowing impleader of defunct manufacturer if
a market can be established for that manufacturer).
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came the DES identification hurdle with a risk contribution theory. 109
Although Martin referred to the risks created by DES manufacturers in
its rationale for developing a market share theory, the concept of a riskbased system never was integrated into the approach. 110
In Collins the Wisconsin Supreme Court found Sindell entirely unworkable. The court agreed with the objective"' of Sindell, but focused
on the practical difficulty of applying a theory dependent on a defined,
proven market share." 2 The court noted that without adequate records
and data, the fact finder's task of constructing a market would be almost impossible." 3 The court was skeptical about the possibility of creating a marketplace because the DES market was fluid; manufacturers
frequently entered and left, producing little trustworthy data even at
the national level. 11 4 Hence, the court decided that a defendant's market share would be only one consideration in the risk equation." 5
Under the Collins theory, a plaintiff only is required to sue one
109. Collins v. Eli Lilly & Co., 116 Wis. 2d -166, 342 N.W.2d 37, cert. denied, 468 U.S. 826
(1984). Rather than attempt to approximate the actual harm that the defendants caused to the
plaintiff, the Collins approach is based on the idea that each defendant contributed to the plaintiff's risk of injury by either distributing DES or participating in gaining approval. See Robinson,
supra note 25, at 737-42 (advocating a risk contribution theory); Wright, supra note 23, at 1820
(explaining that with a risk contribution theory damages can be apportioned accurately by multiplying the total amount of a plaintiff's award by a manufacturer's contribution to the aggregate
risk, which is measured by its market share of DES).
110. Martin, 102 Wash. 2d at 604, 689 P.2d at 382. Martin mentions the concept of risk
contribution, but ultimately attempts to apportion damages according to the actual harm suffered
by each plaintiff. The difference is not crucial to a finding that defendants were negligent, but
rather factors into the process of awarding damages. See infra note 115. Market share is only one
of several factors to be considered by the jury under the Collins approach.
111. Sindell's objective was to socialize costs and shift the burden of negating causation to
defendants. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 610-11, 607 P.2d 924, 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 144, cert. denied,
449 U.S. 912 (1980).
112. Collins, 116 Wis. 2d at 189, 342 N.W.2d at 48.
113. Id. at 190, 342 N.W.2d at 48. The court stated, "We view defining the market and apportioning market share as a near impossible task if it is to be done fairly and accurately in order
to approximate the probability that defendant caused the plaintiff's injuries." Id. (citation
omitted).
114. Id. at 189-90, 342 N.W.2d at 48; cf. infra note 229 and accompanying text (stating that
California courts have found sufficient evidence available at national level).
115. Collins, 116 Wis. 2d'at 190, 342 N.W.2d at 49. The court also was concerned about
wasting judicial resources by holding a minitrial to determine market shares. See id. In determining a defendant's contribution to plaintiff's risk the court instructed juries to consider:
(1) whether the defendant tested DES for safety in use during pregnancy, (2) the role that the
defendant played in gaining FDA approval of the drug for use during pregnancy, (3) the size
of the defendant's market in the relevant area of distribution, (4) whether the defendant took
an active or passive role in producing or marketing the drug, (5) whether the defendant issued
warnings about the drug's dangers, (6) whether the defendant changed its marketing stance
after learning of the drug's dangers, and (7) the steps taken by the defendant to reduce the
risk to the public.
Id. at 200, 342 N.W.2d at 53.

MARKET SHARE LIABILITY

1991]

defendant. 116 The court dismissed as unrealistic the possibility of requiring a defendant to join a reasonable number of potentially liable
defendants because of the tremendous number of DES manufacturers." 7 Once a plaintiff has established her prima facie case, 1 " the burden shifts to the defendants to exculpate themselves."19 To be
exonerated, a defendant must show that its product did not reach the
plaintiff either by proving that it did not produce or market DES during the time of the plaintiff's exposure or by proving that it did not
distribute DES in the plaintiff's geographic market.120 The court believed that this exemption process would create a group of defendants
likely to have caused the plaintiff's injuries by assembling only those
that could have contributed to the risk to which the plaintiff was exposed."2 1 The jury then apportions damages among the pool of defendants using a comparative negligence scheme. 1 22 The court chose a
comparative negligence scheme rather than a percentage-of-the-market
approach because the court valued consideration of a defendant's overall participation in the production and marketing of DES. 12 Among the
collective liability theories, the attempt in Collins to evaluate completely the defendant's activity makes Collins one of the most refined
DES remedies.

24

116. Id. at 193, 342 N.W.2d at 50; see also supra note 81 and accompanying text. Like Martin, Collins rejected the Sindell requirement of joining a substantial share of the defendants.
While requiring the plaintiff to sue only one defendant, the court noted that joining several defendants is in the plaintiff's best interest because the plaintiff has a better chance of showing
liability, a better chance of getting a full recovery, and a decreased possibility of having a later suit
barred by the statute of limitations. Collins, 116 Wis. 2d at 194, 342 N.W.2d at 51. Additionally,
defendants can help their own cases by impleading other manufacturers to dilute liability. Id.
117.

Collins, 116 Wis. 2d at 193, 342 N.W.2d at 50.

118. Id. at 193-94, 342 N.W.2d at 50. The plaintiff's prima facie case must establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that the joined defendant marketed the type of DES ingested by
the plaintiff's mother by showing similar color, shape, markings, or size. Further, the plaintiff must
show that the defendant was negligent in the design or manufacture of the drug and that plaintiff's
injuries proximately resulted from exposure to DES. Id. The court also allowed the plaintiff to
proceed under a theory of strict liability. Id. at 195, 342 N.W.2d at 51.
119.

Id. at 197-98, 342 N.W.2d at 52.

120.

Id.

121.

Id. at 198, 342 N.W.2d at 52.

122.

Id. at 198-99, 342 N.W.2d at 52-53 (citing Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (West Supp. 1990)).

123. Id. at 199, 342 N.W.2d at 53. The court stated that" 'the conduct of the parties considered as a whole ... should control. In other words, once it has been established that each has been
negligent, it is then the jury's function to weigh their respective contributions to the result.'" Id.
(quoting Taylor v. Western Casualty & Sur. Co., 270 Wis. 408, 411-12, 71 N.W.2d 363, 365 (1955)).
124. Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 73 N.Y.2d 487, 511, 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1077-78, 541
N.Y.S.2d 941, 949-50, cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 350 (1989).
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C. Michigan's Method: Alternate Liability
In Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co. 1 25 the Supreme Court of Michigan ap-

plied alternate liability in a DES action. The method employed is similar to that in Martin2 ' except that the plaintiff must make a genuine
127
effort to identify the culpable defendant as a prerequisite to relief.
All defendants unable to exculpate themselves from the pool of manufacturers are held jointly and severally liable. 128 Unlike Martin, Abel
will not allow a defendant to limit its liability solely by proving its market share. 29 Presumably, damages are allocated on a pro rata basis between the defendants unless a defendant does not have the financial
ability to pay.130 The court's rationale for allowing the cause of action is
similar to the rationale of courts using the market share approach.' 3 '
D. Rejection of Market Share
Against the backdrop of states that have adopted a form of market
share or alternate liability, 3 2 three state supreme courts expressly have
rejected a common-law theory of recovery for plaintiffs in DES cases."'
In Zafft v. Eli Lilly & Co.' 3 4 the Missouri Supreme Court refused to
follow the initiative of Michigan, Washington, and Wisconsin. 35 In125. 418 Mich. 311, 343 N.W.2d 164 (1984).
126. See supra notes 81-88 and accompanying text (discussing Martin).
127. Abel, 418 Mich. at 332, 343 N.W.2d at 173.
128. Id. at 334, 343 N.W.2d at 174. Abel is the only DES solution expressly adopting joint
and several liability and requiring a due diligence attempt to locate the culpable defendant as a
prerequisite to recovery.
129. See id. Because of its joint and several liability holding and the requirement of exhausting identification efforts, Abel closely resembles Summers. Abel does not set forth how many defendants must be brought to trial.
130. The Abel regime does not account for a defendant's share of the market in apportioning
liability.
131. The Abel court rationalized its decision on the bases of socialization of cost, fairness to
innocent plaintiffs, and shifting the burden of exculpation to defendants. Abel, 418 Mich. at 32529, 343 N.W.2d at 170-72; see also supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
132. Before 1989 only four state supreme courts had adopted some form of collective liability
to deal with the DES dilemma: Washington, California, Michigan, and Wisconsin. The Conley
decision in Florida, see supra notes 95-108 and accompanying text, and the Hymowitz decision in
New York, see infra subpart VI(A), increased the total to six.
133. The majority of state supreme courts have not taken a position on market share liability, but some federal district courts have rejected the market share doctrine under the doctrine of
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See Tidier v. Eli Lilly & Co., 851 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir.
1988); Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004, 1018 (D.S.C. 1981); see also Schwartz & Mahshigian, supra note 17, at 965 & n.120 and cases cited therein.
134. 676 S.W.2d 241 (Mo. 1984) (en banc). For a more thorough discussion of this case, see
Casenote, DES Recovery in Missouri: Confined by TraditionalTort Principles,53 UMKC L. REv.
692 (1985).
135. See Abel, 418 Mich. at 311, 343 N.W.2d at 164; Martin, 102 Wash. 2d at 581, 689 P.2d
at 368; Collins, 116 Wis. 2d at 166, 342 N.W.2d at 37.
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stead, the court adhered to the traditional tort law requirement of identifying the source of the harm. 's e Characterizing the case as a public
policy decision, 13 7 the court implied that any relaxation of causation requirements should come from the legislature.' 38
The Iowa Supreme Court in Mulcahy v. Eli Lilly & Co.'"9 also refused to adopt a market share or alternate liability theory of recovery in
response to a certified question posed by the district court." 0 Like the
Missouri court in Zafft, the court cited broad policy reasons for its decision."" The court noted that DES cases are appealing claims for relief,
but concluded that the legislature was the appropriate body to address
the "social engineering" inherent in burdening a defendant that has not
been identified
as the plaintiff's wrongdoer simply to aid an innocent
2
plaintiff."1
In the recent decision of Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co.14 s the Illinois

Supreme Court also rejected market share liability. Smith is perhaps
the biggest setback for DES victims because it reversed a 1988 lower
court decision"4 permitting a market share cause of action based on
Martin.'" The court in Smith simply concluded that, regardless of the
model used, market share liability is a flawed concept."46
136. Zafit, 676 S.W.2d at 246-47. The court acknowledged the unique facts of DES cases, but
stated that placing the cost burden on the defendants simply because they can afford it "substantially alters the existing rights and liabilities of the litigants." Id. at 247. Additionally, the court
emphasized the "fundamental... concept of tort law.., that a plaintiff prove ... some nexus
between wrongdoing and injury." Id.; see also supra note 23 and accompanying text.
137. Zafft, 676 S.W.2d at 247. The court showed concern over discouraging research and development by pharmaceutical corporations. See generally Comment, Market Share Liability for
Defective Products:An Ill-Advised Remedy for the Problem of Identification, 76 Nw. UL. REv.
300 (1981).
138. See Zafft, 676 S.W.2d at 247; see also Casenote, supra note 134, at 701 (stating that the
need to confine further growth of tort liability and Missouri's failure to adopt Summers possibly
influenced the court's reluctance to adopt market share liability).
139. 386 N.W.2d 67 (Iowa 1986).
140. Id. at 70. The district court posed the questions as follows: In a DES liability case when
a plaintiff cannot identify the manufacturer of the product after substantial effort and through no
fault of her own, will Iowa law recognize market share, alternate, or enterprise liability? If so, what
must a plaintiff prove to prevail? How may a defendant exculpate itself from liability? The Iowa
Supreme Court also rejected enterprise liability as a viable solution. Id. at 70-72.
141. See id. at 76. The court identified three reasons: Concern about shifting the burden of
proof to the defendant without identification, the burdensome procedures governing the shift, and
the problem of allocating damages.
142. Id. The court stated that the departure from traditional tort law required to hold liable
a potentially innocent defendant lies "more appropriately within the legislative domain." Id.
143. 137 III. 2d 222, 560 N.E.2d 324 (1990). The decision contains a thorough discussion of
the development and current state of market share liability.
144. 173 Ill. App. 3d 1, 527 N.E.2d 333 (1988).
145. For a discussion of Martin, see supra notes 75-88 and accompanying text.
146. Smith, 560 N.E.2d at 337 (stating that the jurisdictions which have adopted market
share liability have criticized and rejected "in whole or in part the theory as developed in the other
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The first of the court's extensive criticisms focused on the unavailability of reliable market information. The court pointed out that the
dearth of information presents trial courts with great difficulty in formulating market shares, 47 prevents apportionment of damages based
on a manufacturer's actual market percentage,' 4 8 and results in arbitrary variations in plaintiffs' awards. 49 The court also expressed concern that market share liability would levy a tremendous burden on the
judiciary and could result in better treatment for plaintiffs who are unable to determine which manufacturer caused their harm than for those
plaintiffs who actually can identify the negligent defendant. 150
V.

MARKET SHARE LIABILITY OUTSIDE THE

A.

DES

CONTEXT

Asbestos

Asbestos litigation parallels some of the characteristics in the DES
cases that gave rise to the development of market share liability and its
offspring, modified alternate liability. Like DES injuries, asbestos-related injuries can have a latency period of about twenty years.' 5 ' As in
the DES market, a large number of companies-as many as 165-manufactured asbestos at one time or another. 52 Asbestos plaintiffs also
have experienced difficulty in identifying the manufacturer responsible
for their injuries.15 3 Most courts, however, have refused to extend market share or alternate liability theories to asbestos victims who were
jurisdictions," and "that market share liability is not a sound theory," and should not be applied
in DES cases).
147. See id. at 337-38 (describing a trial judge's frustration in attempting to develop a narrow, local market without enough data and concluding that a national market is the only realistic
alternative).
148. Id. at 338. The court noted the inherent difficulty of linking damages to a defendant's
actual market share.
149. Id. The court posited that without reliable information, the composition of defendants
in each case will be somewhat arbitrary. With many manufacturers not amenable to suit for a
variety of reasons, such as nonjoinder, mergers, or bankruptcies, a plaintiff's recovery is bound to
change without a meaningful reason. Id.
150. Id. The court explained that a plaintiff who proves causation must bear the risk of a
defendant's insolvency. Yet under market share liability, the risk of insolvency is reduced because
it is spread throughout an entire industry. Thus, market share liability may provide plaintiffs with
more protection against insolvent defendants. Id. at 339.
151. See Special Project, An Analysis of the Legal, Social, and PoliticalIssues Raised by
Asbestos Litigation, 36 VAND.L. REV. 573, 579 n.10 (1983).
152. Id. at 581, n.22.
153. The identification problem stems from two causes. First, many asbestos products carry
no manufacturer's label. Second, plaintiffs often are exposed to several different asbestos products
in their workplace, resulting in causation by multiple defendants and an inability to recall specific
manufacturers. See Endress & Sozio, Market Share Liability: A One Theory Approach Beyond
DES, 1 Dnw. C.L. REv. 1, 8-9 (1983); see also Case v. Fibreboard Corp., 743 P.2d 1062, 1066-67
(Okla. 1987) (describing how identification of an asbestos manufacturer is almost impossible when
the materials were installed years before the plaintiff's exposure).
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unable to identify the specific wrongdoers.15 4
Goldman v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. 5 and Case v. Fibreboard
5
Corp.15 6 are illustrative of the position taken by state supreme courts. 7
In both cases, the plaintiffs were unable to link causation to a specific
company. Both courts rejected market share liability principally for two
reasons: Asbestos products are not fungible, and the asbestos marketplace is complex, making the apportionment of damages difficult.1 58
In Goldman the court noted that the asbestos tape to which the
plaintiff allegedly was exposed could have contained an asbestos content ranging from fifteen percent to one hundred percent. 59 In contrast,
DES is a truly fungible product made from a generic formula that
caused injury in the single context of use by pregnant women.6 0 Hence,
the primary Sindell rationale for shifting the burden to the defendant-the similarity of risk posed by all manufacturers-is not present
in the asbestos industry. Because manufacturers produce asbestos in
approximately three thousand different forms, the variation in asbestos
content is complicated even further.' 6
Although Goldman held that the different degrees of risk posed by
asbestos products alone was sufficient to undercut Sindell, additional
problems plague the asbestos marketplace, such as a complex market
and the absence of Johns-Manville, one of the largest producers. 6 2 Ultimately, notwithstanding the absence of other remedies, both Goldman
and Case held that unlike DES the facts presented in asbestos litigation
do not provide a sufficient rationale for shifting the burdens of proof
63
and cost to manufacturers.
154. See Leng v. Celotex Corp., 196 IlM. App. 3d 647, 554 N.E.2d 468 (1990) and cases cited
therein; Special Project, supra note 151, at 623 and cases cited at note 284. But see Menne v.
Celotex Corp., 641 F. Supp. 1429 (D. Kan. 1986) (applying Nebraska law holding alternate liability
applicable in case in which asbestos products of each defendant joined in the action were present
at plaintiff's workplace).
155.

33 Ohio St. 3d 40, 514 N.E.2d 691 (1987).

156.

743 P.2d 1062 (Okla. 1987).

157.

See Celotex Corp. v. Copeland, 471 So. 2d 533, 538 (Fla. 1985) and cases cited therein.

158.

Goldman, 33 Ohio St. 3d at 50-51, 514 N.E.2d at 700-01; Case, 743 P.2d at 1065-66.

159.

33 Ohio St. 3d at 46, 514 N.E.2d at 697.

160.

Case, 743 P.2d at 1065; see supra text accompanying notes 15-16.

161.

See Goldman, 33 Ohio St. 3d at 50, 514 P.2d at 700.

162. Id. at 51, 514 P.2d at 701. For these same reasons, the court also rejected alternate
liability when the plaintiff could not show that two or more defendants committed tortious acts
and that one of these defendants proximately caused plaintiff's injuries. Id. at 45, 514 P.2d at 696.
163. Both courts concluded that any change must come from the legislature. See id. at 50-52,
514 N.E.2d at 700-02; Case, 743 P.2d at 1066-67.
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Vaccines

Courts have relaxed causation's identification requirement in only
one other area of products liability-vaccines. The developments are
quite narrow, however, with only three published opinions prior to
1989.164 Not long after SindeUl, a California appellate court disallowed
market share liability in Sheffield v. Eli Lilly & Co.' 65 The plaintiff in
Sheffield alleged that she was injured by a defective antipolio vaccine.
The court held Sindell inapplicable for several reasons even though the
plaintiff could not identify the responsible defendant.16 The court
found that a single producer defectively manufactured the antipolio
vaccine and that the underlying formula was not defective. 6 7 All of the
producers and manufacturers of DES, by contrast, adhered to a uniformly defective formula.' 68 Thus, because the negligence in Sheffield
occurred at the manufacturing stage rather than the design stage, not
all manufacturers were equally culpable, nor did they all pose the same
risk to society. 69 Shifting the financial burden to defendants in this
instance necessarily would require holding innocent defendants
liable.

17 0

The court's second line of reasoning was that polio vaccines did not
have a prolonged latency period before a plaintiff discovered the in164. See Morris v. Parke, Davis & Co., 667 F. Supp. 1332 (C.D. Cal. 1987); Sheffield v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 144 Cal. App. 3d 583, 192 Cal. Rptr. 870 (1983); Senn v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 305 Or. 256, 751 P.2d 215 (1988). The use of market share liability outside of the DES context
is limited because few truly fungible products exist. See infra text accompanying notes 315-20.
Shackil v. Lederle Laboratories, 116 N.J. 155, 561 A.2d 511 (1989), is the fourth published decision
addressing the application of market share liability to vaccine-related injuries. Shackil is discussed
infra at subpart VI(B).
165. 144 Cal. App. 3d at 583, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 870.
166. See id. at 592-99, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 875-80.
167. 144 Cal. App. 3d at 594, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 876. For a discussion of the difference between
design and manufacturing defects, see Fischer supra note 46, at 1652-54.
168. See Sheffield, 144 Cal. App. 3d at 594, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 876; see also supra notes 15, 16
and accompanying text.
169. Culpability in manufacturing defects differs with each producer and even between various lots of the drug made by the same producer. Hence, the risk of harm to the plaintiff also
varies. See Fischer, supra note 46, at 1653 (arguing against application of market share liability to
manufacturing defect injuries).
170. The Sheffield court noted that:
[shifting liability] indiscriminately to penalize the careful and careless producer alike ...
fails to act as a deterrent to the latter or provide an incentive to produce safety industrywide, and it may result in keeping beneficial but potentially dangerous products off the market..... The imposition of such liability... would inhibit drug research and development,
unreasonably raise the cost of health care, and punish drug manufacturers who have done no
wrong.
Sheffield, 144 Cal. App. 3d at 598, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 878-79; see also Fischer, supra note 46, at
1652-53; Case Comment, supra note 18, at 944; Note, supra note 26, at 1200-02.
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jury. 171 Hence, the identification problem with DES, which is caused by
a lengthy passage of time, was not present in Sheffield. 7 2 Finally, the
court emphasized the chilling effect that liability in Sheffield could
have imposed on drug manufacturers' willingness to develop new
products.' 7 3
Several years after Sheffield, a federal district court in California
allowed a market share action in Morris v. Parke, Davis & Co.17 4 The
plaintiff in Morris also alleged that a vaccine caused his injuries. 75 The
court found that the diptheria-pertussis-tetanus (DPT) vaccine differed
enough from the polio vaccine in Sheffield to justify relaxing the standard of causation.17 Sheffield dismissed a market share solution largely
because the polio vaccine was manufactured defectively by only one
company. 7 7 Morris, by contrast, held that all of the defendants' DPT
vaccines were defective and that the defendants were collectively negligent in manufacturing, testing, storing, and marketing the vaccine. 17 8
Morris recognized the critical distinction between a common design defect and an isolated manufacturing defect and, consequently, left Sheffield intact. 7 The court, however, explained that no meaningful
distinction exists between design and manufacturing defects when the
latter stems from substandard practices employed by all defendants. 8 0
Hence, the court held the defendants liable for their share of the mar171. See Sheffield, 144 Cal. App. 3d at 595, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 877. The court noted that "the
delay in discovering the alleged causation was in no way related to the nature of the defective
product or any other act or omission of the unknown tortfeasor." Id. In fact, "the onset of the
illness occurred shortly after the victim was inoculated with the vaccine." Id.
172. See id. The court noted that the Sindell problem of identification bore little or no resemblance to the facts surrounding vaccine injuries. Id.
173. See id. at 597, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 879. The court emphasized the necessity of vaccines to
the public welfare, citing the Salk polio vaccine's virtual elimination of poliomyelitis. See id. at 597
& n.9, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 879 & n.9.
174. 667 F. Supp. 1332 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
175. Id. at 1334. The plaintiff was unable to identify the precise manufacturer of the drug.
Id.
176. See id. at 1340-43. The court found that the nature of the defect aligned the case with
Sindell rather than Sheffield, thereby justifying a shift in the burden of proof to the defendants.
See id. at 1341-42.
177. See supra notes 167-70 and accompanying text.
178. Morris, 667 F. Supp. at 1342. The court accepted the plaintiff's reasoning that the case
was distinct from Sheffield because the manufacturing defect in Morris was present in each of the
defendants' products because of" 'shared common inadequacies' in manufacturing, testing, storage
and marketing." Id.
179. See id. at 1341-42. The court distinguished Sheffield on two grounds: First, Sheffield
concerned an isolated manufacturing defect only, and second, a uniform design defect justifies
shifting the burden of proof to the defendants. See id. at 1342.
180. Id. at 1342. The court argued that if the defect is common to all of the products resulting from "common ... substandard means of production, storage, transportation, or marketing,"
id., then the fact that the defect was caused by design or manufacturing is irrelevant.
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ket in which they had acted tortiously.' 8 1 The Morris opinion, however,

ignored two.issues at the forefront of Sheffield: The Sindell latency issue and market share liability's potential deterrent effect on vaccine research and development.182
Morris has not spread beyond California. s In Senn v. MerrellDow Pharmaceuticals,Inc., 84 the only other pi'e-1989 decision addressing a market share claim for DPT injuries, the Oregon Supreme Court
did not follow Morris.85 At the time of the decision, Oregon had not
adopted the Summers v. Tice'86 version of alternate liability.1 87 Senn
refused to adopt Summers even though both possible vaccine manufacturers were before the court. The court held that alternate liability represented a significant change in traditional tort law causation and that
the legislature must make a change of this magnitude. 88
C. Products Liability Generally
Market share solutions to the problem of indeterminate defendants
have had limited acceptance in DES cases and have been rejected almost entirely when applied to other semifungible products, such as asbestos and vaccines. Courts uniformly have denied attempts to apply
market share liability to the remaining spectrum of products liability
injuries. 1 9 In Poole v. Alpha Therapeutic Corp. 90 an Illinois federal
district court refused to extend market share alternate liability to an
action seeking recovery for an allegedly defective antihemophiliac blood
product. Stephen Poole, a hemophiliac, allegedly contracted Acquired
Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) from an internal injection of antihemophiliac factor VIII, resulting in his death.' 9 ' Poole's mother
181. Id. at 1343.
182. See supra notes 171-73 and accompanying text.
183. California is the only state that has allowed the use of market share liability in vaccine
cases. The impact of Morris is limited further by the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1 to 300aa-34 (1988), which requires exhaustion of the federal remedy before pursuing a state tort claim. See infra note 311.
184. 305 Or. 256, 751 P.2d 215 (1988).
185. The court did not adopt any other market share solution either. See id. at 265-71, 751
P.2d at 219-23.
186. 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948).
187. See Senn, 305 Or. at 263, 751 P.2d at 219. Possibly the justices felt that the move from
no collective liability theories to market share liability was too radical for one case.
188. Id. at 271, 751 P.2d at 223. The court stated that the legislature has the job of adopting
one form of alternate liability, although the court found all forms of alternate liability to be inconsistent with common-law theories of causation. Id.
189. Aside from DES cases and Morris v. Parke, Davis & Co., very few, if any, courts have
allowed market share liability in products liability cases. Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 137 Ill. 2d 222,
560 N.E.2d 324 (1990).
190. 696 F. Supp. 351 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
191. Id. at 352.
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claimed that the named defendants solicited blood donors from highrisk segments of the population without adequate screening and testing
procedures.'
Ms. Poole was able to identify and join all the manufacturers that
supplied the blood product, but she could not prove that any specific
defendants were liable. 93 The district court refused the plaintiff's plea
to apply Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co.,' which at the time permitted a market share alternate liability action for DES, because the court was concerned about expanding Illinois tort law unjustifiably beyond
precedent. 19 5 The court noted that Smith expressly limited its holding
to DES cases.' The court emphasized also that market share liability
is an inappropriate solution for cases in which the plaintiff has identified all potentially negligent defendants. 197 The court stated that a
plaintiff's inability to identify the wrongdoer was one of the primary
9 the absence of which forecloses a market share
rationales of Sindell,"'
9
9
cause of action.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. 173 Ill. App. 3d 1, 527 N.E.2d 333 (1988). The Illinois Supreme Court subsequently
reversed Smith. See supra notes 143-50 and accompanying text. Relying on Smith, the plaintiff in
Poole sought to have damages apportioned between the defendants based on their respective market shares. 696 F. Supp. at 353.
195. Poole, 696 F. Supp. at 354. The court was concerned about expanding the scope of market share liability beyond that which Smith provided for at the time. Because Smith expressly
limited market share liability to the facts of DES cases, the court expressed doubt in Poole that an
Illinois state court would expand the doctrine in the same circumstances. Id. at 353-54.
196. Id. at 353.
197. Id. The court cited Lipke v. Celotex Corp., 153 I. App. 3d 498, 505 N.E.2d 1213 (1987),
an asbestos case which held that market share liability is inapplicable in cases in which "'the
plaintiff has offered evidence that the identified defendant's product is the cause of the injury.'"
Poole, 696 F. Supp. at 353 (quoting Lipke).
198. See Poole, 696 F. Supp. at 353. The court strongly emphasized the identification dilemma of Sindell as one of the primary reasons why market share liability was adopted in Smith.
The court reiterated that "'[the fundamental premise of the market share theory is that the
plaintiff lacks sufficient identification information to make out a cause of action under traditional
standards of tort liability.'" Id. (quoting Smith, 173 I. App. 3d at 22, 527 N.E.2d at 346).
199. See id. at 354. Predicting that the Illinois Supreme Court would extend Summers to the
uncharted area of AIDS cases, however, the court permitted the plaintiff to amend her complaint
and add an alternate liability claim. Id. at 355-56. The flexibility afforded by comment h of § 433B
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts regarding modification of alternate liability supported the
court's position. Id. at 355 (citing RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 433B comment h (1977)); see
also supra note 44 and accompanying text. Equally significant, however, the plaintiff satisfied one
of the most important aspects of alternate liability: she brought all possible wrongdoers before the
court. See Poole, 696 F. Supp. at 354.
The court cited two fairly recent cases that permitted the use of alternate liability when the
plaintiff was able to bring all possible wrongdoers before the court: Menne v. Celotex Corp., 641 F.
Supp. 1429 (D. Kan. 1986) (allowing use of alternate liability in asbestos case) and In re "Agent
Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (permitting use of alternate liability in Agent Orange case). The court noted the potential controversy of applying alter-

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:395

Another Illinois decision, York v. Lunkes,200 further illustrates the

inapplicability of a market-based recovery scheme to consumer and industrial products liability cases.2 01 The plaintiff in York was injured

when he attempted to jump-start a car and the car battery exploded.
The explosion completely destroyed the battery, making identification

of the manufacturer impossible.20 2 The court, however, refused to follow
the approach that Smith had allowed just one year earlier.2 0 8 The court

stated that, unlike DES, batteries produced by different manufacturers
are physically distinguishable from each other and are not uniformly
defective.2 0 4 Hence, the court found no justification for shifting the burden of proof to the defendant even though the plaintiff, unable to identify the manufacturer, was remediless. 20 5 Market share liability has
found no role in traditional products liability actions because the facts
that distinguish DES litigation are absent. 6

VI.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

A. Revitalization of Market Share Liability: Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly
& CO.207

In Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co. the plaintiff, Mindy Hymowitz, alleged that her cancer was caused by her mother's use of DES during
pregnancy.20 s The plaintiff did not discover her cancerous condition until she was a young adult, four years after the statute of limitations had
nate liability to an AIDS case, but found that an Illinois state court was likely to hold similarly.
Poole, 697 F. Supp. at 355-56. For a discussion on the impact of products liability on AIDS cases,

see McKenna, The Impact of ProductLiability Law on the Development of a Vaccine Against the
AIDS Virus, 55 U. CHL L. REv. 943 (1988).

200.

189 Ili. App. 3d 689, 545 N.E.2d 478 (1989).

201. For other examples of the unsuccessful application of market share liability to industrial
products liability cases, see Griffin v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 964 (W.D.N.C. 1986)
(disallowing market share liability in industrial dye products liability case in which the plaintiff

could not identify the specific manufacturer); Bradley v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 590 F.
Supp. 1177 (D.S.D. 1984) (holding concerted action, enterprise, and market share liability inappli-

cable in case dealing with defective tire rim when the plaintiff could not identify the exact defendant); and Catherwood v. American Sterilizer Co., 139 Misc. 2d 901, 532 N.Y.S.2d 216 (Sup. Ct.
1988) (holding market share liability inapplicable to industrial gas case in which all possible defendants were identified); see also Bixler v. Avondale Mills, 405 N.W.2d 428 (Minn. App. 1987)
(disallowing alternate liability in flammable cotton flannelette case because product not fungible).

202. Lunkes, 545 N.E.2d at 479.
203.

Smith subsequently has been reversed. See supra notes 143-50 and accompanying text.

204. Lunkes, 545 N.E.2d at 480. In addition, strong evidence suggested that the two defendants before the court did not make batteries to fit the type of car that had exploded. Id.
205. The court reiterated the need for plaintiffs in products liability cases to identify the
supplier of the defective product and to prove the defective product actually caused the injury. Id.
206. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.

207. 73 N.Y.2d 487, 539 N.E.2d 1069, 541 N.Y.S.2d 941, cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 350 (1989).
208. Id. at 502, 539 N.E.2d at 1071, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 943.
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tolled. 20 9 A New York revival statute, however, permitted her to file a
claim against several DES manufacturers. 21° The New York State trial

court denied the drug producers' motion to dismiss.211 The court held
that the plaintiff's inability to identify the specific manufacturer of the
DES ingested by her mother did not render the revival statute unconstitutional2 2 because the plaintiff still must prove the other elements of
causation. 21 ' New York's highest court-the court of appeals-upheld

the trial court's decision. 2 4 The court of appeals announced that New
York would adopt a market share theory of liability, based on a national market.1 5 The court held also that the drug companies would be
severally liable only.216 The decision, however, does not allow individual
defendants to exculpate themselves by affirmatively proving that the
plaintiff's mother did not ingest a particular defendant's DES.21
Rather, a defendant is absolved from liability only after an affirmative
28
showing that it never marketed DES for use during pregnancy.
1. Court's Reasoning
In reaching its decision to adopt a market share cause of action, the
Hymowitz court traced the decade-long development of market share
209. Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 136 Misc. 2d 482, 483, 518 N.Y.S.2d 996, 998 (Sup. Ct.
1987). The plaintiff was born in 1954, but did not discover the cancer until 1979. Under the New
York Statute of Limitations, the plaintiff had until 1975 to file the suit, three years after she
reached the age of majority. Id.
210. See 1986 N.Y. Laws ch. 682, § 4. The statute provides a one-year revival period in which
plaintiffs may file a suit for injuries resulting from latent effects of toxic torts. The statute revived
between 500 and 700 DES claims. Rheingold, The Hymowitz Decision-PracticalAspects of New
York DES Litigation, 55 BROoKLYN L. Rv. 883 (1989).
211. Hymowitz, 136 Misc. 2d at 489, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 1002.
212. Id.
213. Id. The court's opinion implied that a market share cause of action is compatible with
the need to allocate liability based on the defendant's negligence.
214. See Hymowitz, 73 N.Y.2d at 487, 539 N.E.2d at 1069, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 941. The court of
appeals' decision affirmed the intermediate appeal, see 139 A.D.2d 437, 526 N.Y.S.2d 922 (1988),
and upheld the constitutionality of the revival statute, thereby opening the door to hundreds of
plaintiffs. See 73 N.Y.2d at 516, 539 N.E.2d at 1080, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 952.
215. Hymowitz, 73 N.Y.2d at 511, 539 N.E.2d at 1078, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 950. The court declined to follow its earlier holding in Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 55 N.Y.2d 571, 436 N.E.2d 182, 450
N.Y.S.2d 776 (1982), which was based on a modified version of concerted action. Hymowitz, 73
N.Y.2d at 508, 539 N.E.2d at 1076, 541 N.Y.S. 2d at 948. Bichler was also a DES case whose theory
in essence substituted conscious parallel activity by the defendants for the plaintiff's inability to
identify the specific defendant. The court in Hymowitz found that the commonplace occurrence of
parallel activity in industry would expand this version of concerted activity beyond its "rational or
fair limit." Id. Instead, the court opted for market share liability because it is "tailored more
closely to the varying culpableness of individual DES producers." Id. at 508-09, 539 N.E.2d at
1076, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 948.
216. Hymowitz, 73 N.Y.2d at 512-13, 539 N.E.2d at 1078, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 950.
217. Id. at 512, 539 N.E.2d at 1078, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 950.
218. Id.
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2 19 to George
and alternate liability from Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories
22
0
v. Parke-Davis. The court agreed with previous authorities that alternate liability and concerted action, although sometimes helpful to a
plaintiff who is unable to identify the wrongful defendant, cannot han-

dle the DES problems without modification. 221 The court rejected alter-

nate liability principally because the defendants in DES cases are in no
better position to identify the negligent party than are plaintiffs.222 Additionally, the court argued that the rationale for shifting the burden of
disproving causation is decreased substantially in actions with several
potential defendants. 223 The court found concerted action inapplicable

to DES cases because of insufficient evidence to prove that the defendants tortiously acted with a common plan or design.22 ' Although the
court recognized that some jurisdictions had refused to proceed beyond
traditional common-law remedies without legislative guidance,225 the
court found that the overall circumstances of DES cases weighed heavily in favor of forging a remedy for victims of DES.2 2
Having recognized the need for a remedy, the court looked to prior
DES opinions for guidance in creating an appropriate method. 227 The
experience gained from previous decisions and the large number of
cases pending in New York caused the court to choose a national marketplace to ascribe liability among the defendants. 22 The court first
219. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
Sindell is discussed supra at subpart I(A).
220. 107 Wash. 2d 564, 592-93, 733 P.2d 507, 512 (1987) (applying Martin v. Abbott Laboratories market share alternate liability to DES case and advocating the narrowest possible relevant

market determination); see also supra notes 81-88 (discussing Martin). Parke-Davis is discussed
supra note 82.
221. See Hymowitz, 73 N.Y.2d at 507, 539 N.E.2d at 1075, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 947; see also
supra notes 30-37 and accompanying text.
222. Hymowitz, 73 N.Y.2d at 505-06, 539 N.E.2d at 1074, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 946. The court
reasoned that the substantial number of possible wrongdoers, many of which no longer exist, and
the drug's long latency period have left defendants with no better information than plaintiffs could
uncover. The court noted also that one of the rationales for shifting the burden of proof in Summers was that defendants have better information than plaintiffs. Id.
223. Id.; see also supra note 46.
224. Hymowitz, 73 N.Y.2d at 506, 539 N.E.2d at 1074-75, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 946-47.
225. See, e.g., Mulcahy v. Eli Lilly & Co., 386 N.W.2d 67 (Iowa 1986); Zaift v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
676 S.W.2d 241 (Mo. 1984); see also supra subpart IV(D).
226. Hymowitz, 73 N.Y.2d at 507, 539 N.E.2d at 1075, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 947. Inherent in the
court's decision were the unique facts surrounding DES litigation and the fact that the legislature
"consciously created ... expectations [of recovery] by reviving hundreds of DES cases." Id.; cf.
Shackil v. Lederle Laboratories, 116 N.J. 155, 184-87, 561 A.2d 511, 526-27 (1989) (finding that the

alternative remedy provided by the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act and state legislation
"evinc[ing] an intent to limit the expansion of products liability law" weighed against adopting
market share liability in vaccine injury case).
227. Hymowitz, 73 N.Y.2d at 508-11, 539 N.E.2d at 1075-77, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 947-49.
228. Id. at 511, 539 N.E.2d at 1077, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 949. The court recognized the costly,
time-consuming process of relitigating market shares in each new case and adopted a national
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noted the developments in California following Sindell. Many courts in
California had attempted to use small geographic markets before adopt229
ing a national marketplace as the fairest and most informed method.
The court also discussed the approach taken by the Washington Supreme Court, which treats defendants' market shares as a question of
fact to be litigated in each case based on a manufacturer's share of the
relevant geographic area. 23 0 The court found the Washington approach
unacceptable because of the possible need for several market matrices
in a state like New York in which many plaintiffs probably had ingested
DES outside the state. 23 1 The court also referenced the Collins riskbased approach,2 3 2 which the court considered to be the most thorough
consideration of each defendant's activities. The court decided, however, that Collins would be effective only when used on a limited
scale.23 3 Mindful that the revival statute renewed approximately five
hundred cases, the court showed concern over the delay and inconsistencies that Collins would create if used in New York.23 4
The court's selection of a national market, however, did not blind
the court to two attendant drawbacks. First, a national marketplace is
likely to create an inaccurate relationship between a defendant's individual liability and the injuries actually caused by that defendant
within New York State.23 5 Second, a national marketplace may fail to
reflect accurately the connection between a defendant's liability and the
risk a defendant posed to a specific plaintiff.236 Nevertheless, the court
market "for essentially practical reasons." Id. at 511, 539 N.E.2d at 1078, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 949.
229. Id. at 509, 539 N.E.2d at 1076, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 948; see also In re Complex DES Litig.,
No. 830-109 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 16, 1985); Twerski, Market Share-A Tale of Two Centuries,55
BROOKLYN L. REv. 869, 870 (1989) (explaining that the actual decision to use a national market
apparently stemmed from an agreement between the DES litigants).
230. Hymowitz, 73 N.Y.2d at 510-11, 539 N.E.2d at 1077, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 949 (citing George
v. Parke-Davis, 107 Wash. 2d 584, 593, 733 P.2d 507, 512 (1987)).
231. Hymowitz, 73 N.Y.2d at 511, 539 N.E.2d at 1077, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 949. The court stated
that establishing separate market shares would be "an unfair, and perhaps impossible burden to
routinely place upon the litigants in individual cases." Id.
232. See supra notes 109, 115 and accompanying text.
233. Hymowitz, 73 N.Y.2d at 511, 539 N.E.2d at 1077-78, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 949-50.
234. See id. The court stated "we are very wary, however, of setting loose, for application in
the hundreds of cases pending in this State, a theory which requires ... individualized ... assessment of ... liabilit[y] . . .in every case." Id.

235. Id. at 511-12, 539 N.E.2d at 1078, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 950.
236. Id. at 512, 539 N.E.2d at 1078, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 950. The court made no pretense of
approximating, in the long run, the actual causation to New York plaintiffs in general and to the
litigating plaintiff in particular. This approach is a substantial departure from Sindell, which attempted to approximate each defendant's liability according to its responsibility "for the injuries
caused by its own products." Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 612, 607 P.2d 924, 937,
163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 145, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980). The court in Hymowitz stated: "We have
heeded the practical lessons learned by other jurisdictions, resulting in our adoption of a national
market theory with full knowledge that it concedes the lack of a logical link between liability and
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favored basing liability for manufacturing DES on the defendant's overall culpability in marketing DES for pregnancy-related complications;
this liability is measured according to the risk created for the public at
large, not the risk posed to a specific plaintiff. 3 7 The court reasoned
that this broad approach equitably satisfies the plaintiff's need for relief, but still provides defendants with a rational method for apportioning liability. 38
The court extended its overall risk approach by preventing a defendant from exculpating itself with proof that its product did not
cause the plaintiff's injuries. 29 The court reasoned that this protection
mechanism would favor defendants that marketed a conspicuous pill or
sold only to certain drugstores because plaintiffs might remember the
particular pill or store more readily, thus increasing the likelihood that
a manufacturer would be exonerated. 240 The court also noted that indi-

vidually exculpating defendants would frustrate the overall risk scheme
because the scheme does not attempt to link causation to each plaintiff.241 Thus, Hymowitz holds that a defendant can avoid liability only
242
by proving it did not market DES for use during pregnancy.
In an effort to offset the elimination of exculpation, however, the
court held that DES producers would be severally liable only. 243 The

court refused to inflate a defendant's share of the market to compensate for absent or insolvent defendants even though some plaintiffs
likely will receive less than a full recovery. 244 The court reasoned that
the same forces working against defendant exculpation equally disfavored inflating a defendant's liability beyond its market share simply
because a plaintiff was wise or fortunate enough to join solvent
defendants. 2 "
causation in a single case." Hymowitz, 73 N.Y.2d at 513 n.3, 539 N.E.2d at 1078 n.3, 541 N.Y.S.2d
at 950 n.3.
237. Hymowitz, 73 N.Y.2d at 512, 539 N.E.2d at 1078, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 950.
238. Id.
239. See id. To date Hymowitz is the first and only case to disallow exculpation of innocent
defendants. See Twerski, supra note 229, at 872.
240. Hymowitz, 73 N.Y.2d at 512, 539 N.E.2d at 1078, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 950. The court's reasoning also could have the opposite effect. A defendant with a more conspicuous pill could face
increased liability because a plaintiff could recall the pill more easily and could sue the defendant
directly. Similarly, a conspicuous pill or drugstore would be more readily identifiable through discovery, thereby dispensing with the need for market share altogether.
241. See id.
242. See id. at 512 & n.2, 539 N.E.2d at 1078 & n.2, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 950 & n.2. This holding
is consistent with the court's overall risk approach because such a defendant obviously did not
contribute to DES victims' risk of injury.
243. Id. at 512-13, 539 N.E.2d at 1078, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 950.
244. Id. at 513, 539 N.E.2d at 1078, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 950.
245. Id. The court provided, "we eschewed exculpation to prevent the fortuitous avoidance of
liability, and thus, equitably, we decline to unleash the same forces to increase a defendant's liabl-
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The Benefits of a National Marketplace

Only after years of litigation following Sindell's cursory treatment
of the DES marketplace did the California courts learn that the paucity
of DES market information would not permit an accurate local market
and that a national marketplace is the only realistic alternative. 4 6
Other courts still fluctuate between using national and local marketplaces 24 7 even though several commentators advocate using a national
248
market.
A national marketplace offers a unitary standard that is applicable
to all DES cases and, consequently, dispenses with difficult, complicated computations based on smaller geographic units. 24 This unitary
standard eases the parties' burdens at trial and should yield more consistent results for both plaintiffs and defendants on a case-by-case basis.25 ° Using a national market also reduces litigation costs for plaintiffs
and defendants by eliminating the need to reconstruct a new market in
Once the national market is established by pooling toeach case.
gether the resources of all defendants, courts in all jurisdictions will be
able to use it, thus conserving judicial resources. 52 A national marketplace naturally will implicate most or all large DES producers and
should result in a more fully informed distribution breakdown.25 3
Additionally, many plaintiffs assert that a handful of large drug
manufacturers are responsible for ninety percent of the DES distributed nationwide.2 5 4 Hence, a national market should produce an accurate division of overall liability measured by each defendant's
contribution of risk to society. At the very least, a national market will
capture the general distribution of DES to the American public even
though many distributors no longer exist because of insolvency or
ity beyond its fair share of responsibility." Id. (footnote omitted).
246. See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
247. See, e.g., Conley v. Boyle Drug Co., No. 67,626 (Fla. Nov. 1, 1990) (LEXIS, States ibrary, Fla. file) (permitting national market figures only if necessary); George v. Parke-Davis, 107
Wash. 2d 584, 733 P.2d 507 (1987) (same).
248. See, e.g., Fischer, supra note 46, at 1644; Twerski, supra note 229, at 871 & n.7 (stating
that "a narrow definition of the market does violence to the fundamental market share liability
theory" and questioning "why have some courts still not seen the light" and opted for a national
market); Note, supra note 26, at 1179.
249. Fischer, supra note 46, at 1643-45.
250. See Note, supra note 26, at 1189-90.
251. See Rheingold, supra note 210, at 894-95 (describing the difficulty of building a national
market matrix, but stating that 500 cases were consolidated for one market share trial that will
bind them all).
252. See id.
253. See id. at 895 (discussing the educated-guess result of a partial market analysis in a Los
Angeles DES case).
254. See Note, supra note 26, at 1190 & n.59.
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merger. Finally, a national market is well suited for a state the size of
New York in which many plaintiffs likely have been exposed to DES
outside the state.2 55
3.

Defendant Exculpation: Attempting to Approximate Actual
Causation

In using a national market, Hymowitz foregoes an approximation
of the harm caused within the state and the harm caused to a particular
plaintiff256 -two objectives of Sindel12' and Martin.258 The sacrifice
seems nominal, however,' because an analysis of Hymowitz's predecessors suggests that approximating a defendant's liability to each plaintiff's harm is quite difficult and perhaps unnecessary for the purposes of
market share liability.
All of the decisions preceding Hymowitz permit defendants to exculpate themselves from liability if they can produce the requisite evidence. 25 9 The main goal of exculpation is to assemble a group of
defendants who most likely contributed to the plaintiff's injury by eliminating those who definitely have not.28 0 The courts allowing exculpation also show concern for the seeming injustice of holding innocent
defendants liable. 261 Case-by-case exoneration, however, is based on the
proof available to the defendant that a specific plaintiff's mother did
not use its product, not on the degree of the defendant's responsibility
for the plaintiff's actual injuries based on its percentage of the relevant
market. Hence, a manufacturer's liability fluctuates arbitrarily depending on the evidence available in each case and is not truly linked to
relative culpability.26 2 The irony of this flaw is that the absence of information detailing the distribution of DES is what prevented plaintiffs
from proving actual causation and was a major catalyst for creating
market share liability. 2 3 A system of recovery that rewards only those
manufacturers fortunate enough to possess exculpatory evidence, while
punishing those that do not, merely compounds the problem of deft255. Hymowitz, 73 N.Y.2d at 511, 539 N.E.2d at 1077, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 949; see also Rheingold, supra note 210, at 893 n.38 (explaining that the Hymowitz holding is limited to plaintiffs
born in New York).
256. See supra note 236 and accompanying text.
257. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
258. See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
259. See supra notes 50, 82, 106, 128 and accompanying text.
260. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
261. See id.
262. See Fischer, supra note 46, at 1643-45 (stating that the exculpation process is a "lottery
based on the fortuity of the availability of evidence" and that the "availability of proof rather than
the [defendant's] culpability" determines liability).
263. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
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cient information. Market share liability strives to circumvent the information gap in an individual case by using distribution statistics.
Courts should not allow defendants to manipulate this information gap,
thereby yielding different results for two defendants with the same
share of the market merely because one possesses exculpatory evidence
and the other does not. The unfortunate result is an uneven distribution of liability among DES manufacturers. 6 4
Rather than justify market share liability as a gauge for a defendant's contribution to a plaintiff's actual injury, some commentators
have suggested that Sindell and its progeny are best viewed as a risk
contribution theory. 265 According to this approach, by producing a uniformly defective product from a generic formula each DES manufacturer contributed to the aggregate risk to which a DES victim was
exposed. 6 8 Commentators have argued that apportioning liability according to contribution of risk is fair 26 7 and that focusing on risk contribution overcomes the criticism that market share liability holds
defendants responsible without proof of causation.268
Hymowitz fully embodies the risk contribution rationale and logically extends the principle from liability based on the risk of harm
posed to a single DES victim to liability based on the risk of harm
posed to society. 6 9 Permitting defendant exculpation2 70 is inconsistent

with Hymowitz's focus on the overall risk created by DES because no
264. See Fischer, supra note 46, at 872; Twerski, supra note 229, at 872 (characterizing exculpation as "arrant nonsense" because it simply dumps one defendant's "percentage of the harm
upon other defendants who cannot prove the negative"). A potential drawback to disallowing exculpation, however, is that manufacturers may not receive an adequate incentive to maintain accurate records of drug distribution.
265. See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 25, at 716-17, 734-41; Wright, supra note 23, at 1819-21;
Partlett, The Common Law As Cricket (Book Review), 43 VAN. L. REv. 1401, 1419-20 (1990)
(stating: "That liability ought to accord with the risk of harm created by the manufacture and
distribution of a product was a logical implication of the basis" of Hymowitz and the prior DES
cases); see also Collins v. Eli Lilly & Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 342 N.W.2d 37 (1984), discussed supra
notes 109-24 and accompanying text.
266. Robinson, supra note 25, at 717; Wright, supra note 23, at 1819-20.
267. See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 25, at 739-40 (arguing that risk contribution is fair because "each defendant made a 'defective' product that created an unreasonable risk of the harm
the plaintiff suffered," thus allowing fault to "be imputed to a defendant's conduct from the fact
that it made a product that created such a risk").
268. See, e.g., Wright, supra note 23, at 1820 (stating that "the approach avoids the ...
concern in Sindell that the defendants are being held liable without proof of actual causation
[because] [i]n each case, a defendant firm is held liable only if the plaintiff proves that the firm
tortiously contributed to the aggregate risk").
269. See supra notes 235-41 and accompanying text.
270. In this context exculpation means exonerating those defendants that can prove that
their DES was not ingested by the victim's mother. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
Recall that under Hymowitz a defendant still can be exonerated if it did not market DES for use
during pregnancy. See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
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amount of exculpatory evidence in a single cause of action can2 reduce
a
71
victims.
DES
all
to
risk
of
contribution
defendant's aggregate
4.

Several Liability

Hymowitz's holding of several liability also is consistent with the
goals of market share liability. Several liability limits a defendant's
damages to its share of the DES market. As explained in Brown, unless
each possible defendant is before the court and can carry its financial
burden, joint liability is likely to distort the distribution of damages in
relation to a defendant's share of the DES market.27 2 Abel v. Eli Lilly &
Co., the only DES decision expressly allowing joint and several liability,273 highlights the inequity of holding one defendant liable for a
plaintiff's entire judgment. Because Abel is a virtual replica of alternate
liability, the group of defendants before the court and their respective
solvency will influence heavily a defendant's share of damages. 274 Rarely
will the result resemble a defendant's market share. Yet because of the
possibility that none of the defendants in a given lawsuit actually
harmed the plaintiff, adhering to manufacturers' market shares is crucial to limiting liability.
5.

Apportioning Damages

With Martin and its successors, many factors other than a defendant's market share enter the liability equation. Under Martin, defendants that are not exculpated constitute the plaintiff's market and are
presumed to have equal market shares.27 5 A defendant can rebut this
presumption only by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a
defendant had a smaller share.2 7 6 Defendants without this evidence receive inflated shares to account for one hundred percent of the market. 7 Hence, all defendants must carry their burden of proof to ensure
that no defendant pays more than its share. Absent this improbable
271. Arguably, defendant exculpation does not advance the rationale behind contribution of
risk to a single plaintiff either. See Robinson, supra note 25, at 740 (arguing that "[w]hether the
defendant's actions caused injury in the particular case does not alter the character of its [negligent] conduct, which was as final as the defendant could make it"). But see Wright, supra note 23,
at 1820 (arguing that "if a certain firm can prove that it did not provide any of the [victim's] DES,
. . .it cannot be held liable for.

. .

having exposed.

. .

a risk that possibly led to [an] injury").

272. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
273. 418 Mich. 311, 343 N.W.2d 164 (1984); see supra note 128 and accompanying text.
274. See supra note 130 and accompanying text. Apparently, under Abel each defendant's
damages will reflect its share of the market only if each defendant is solvent and all potential
defendants are joined in the action.
275. See supra text accompanying notes 82-83.
276. See supra text accompanying note 83.
277. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
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occurrence, a defendant's liability will not reflect its share of the market.278 Under the Martin regime, a defendant without distribution information is penalized substantially. This defendant will be unable to
prove exculpation, will be unable to rebut its presumptive share, and
possibly will have its presumptive share inflated to construct a complete
market. In cases following Martin,the emphasis on narrow markets, for
which less information is available, increases the likelihood that defendants in these markets will confront this problem.
Both Martin's default pro rata share and the inflated award are
dependent on another factor unrelated to the marketplace: the group of
defendants that ultimately composes the plaintiff's market. This result
is caused by Martin's basis in alternate liability and its adjustment of a
defendant's share of damages depending on the composition of defendants joined in each action.2 79 Hence, a defendant's ultimate liability
could reflect the availability of market information in a given market
and the solvency of the joined defendants just as well as it could reflect
the defendant's distribution of DES. Because so many considerations
unrelated to a defendant's "fault" as to a particular plaintiff influence
the distribution of damages, Martin's objective of individual, faultbased liability seems impracticable.
The scheme in Collins is an improvement over Martin inasmuch as
it focuses on the degree of a defendant's contribution to the risk posed
to the DES plaintiff, rather than the likelihood that a defendant actually harmed the plaintiff.280 A jury apportioning damages under the
Collins structure must consider many aspects of the defendant's role in
producing and marketing DES for use during pregnancy.2 81 No presumption about the defendant's market share is employed, and market
distribution records play only a limited role in determining a defendant's contribution to risk.282 Therefore, a jury award under Collins
theoretically should reflect a defendant's contribution to the plaintiff's
risk of injury more than it reflects the presence of reliable information
or the solvency of the defendants before the court.
Collins, however, also suffers from shortcomings. First, while Collins apportions damages according to a comparative negligence scheme,
a plaintiff may recover full damages from just one defendant if only one
278. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
279. See supra note 83 and accompanying text (explaining that the damages are spread
among the defendants that cannot exculpate themselves).
280. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
281. See supra note 115 (listing factors that the jury is to consider in making this
assessment).
282. See supra note 110 (stating that defendant's market share is only one of several
considerations).
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is joined. 8 Since this defendant is unlikely to represent one hundred
percent of the plaintiff's market, the defendant's damages will not
equal its contribution to the plaintiff's risk of being harmed.2 4 Second,
even though Collins reduces the importance of market share statistics,
Collins ironically allows a defendant to exculpate itself provided that
the defendant can muster the requisite market information.2

85

Because

Collins expressed skepticism about the existence of reliable market information, allowing defendants to use this information to avoid liability
seems somewhat hypocritical. 8 6 Finally, Collins's focus on the risk to a
particular plaintiff requires that a new market formulation be litigated
in each case. Relitigating market shares is not only costly to the parties
in each case, but also places a substantial strain on judicial resources.
6. Hymoii'itz's Shortcomings
Although Hymowitz is an improvement over its predecessors, it
leaves vital questions unanswered. Presumably, a plaintiff needs to
bring suit against only one defendant, but the court does not provide
any guidance on this issue. Under the court's several liability holding,
however, a plaintiff would benefit from joining as many defendants as
possible to increase the likelihood of a full recovery. The court also provides no solution in the event that market share statistics are unavailable for a defendant. 7 Additionally, the court fails to announce who
bears the burden of proof in establishing a market and the consequences for failing to meet this burden. 288 These omissions are surprising considering the opportunity that the Hymowitz court had to learn
from the debates engendered by Sindell's neglect of critical issues.2 89
The biggest shortcoming of Hymowitz may be that it is only availa283. See Collins v. Eli Lilly & Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 181, 342 N.W.2d 37, 50 (1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984).
284. See Wright, supra note 109 (describing the correlation between risk and market share).
285. See supra text accompanying notes 119-20.
286. Yet by allowing exculpation for a defendant in each case in which the victim's mother
did not ingest that defendant's product, Collins consistently focuses on the risk posed to a particular plaintiff.
287. Perhaps the court ignored this scenario under the impression that a national market
would yield statistics for all defendants.
Creating a due diligence prerequisite to recovery like that which the Florida Supreme Court
applied in Conley v. Boyle Drug Co., No. 67,626 (Fla. Nov. 1, 1990) (LEXIS, States library, Fla.
file), see supra note 104 and accompanying text, and Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 418 Mich. 311, 343
N.W.2d 164 (1984), see supra note 127 and accompanying text, would be a solid addition to the
Hymowitz framework.
288. The defendant most likely bears the burden of going forward with the market evidence.
Failure to meet this burden, however, raises the same dilemma as that of a defendant without any
information.
289. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
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ble in New York. Perhaps Congress and state legislatures are more to
blame than state judiciaries, but the limited acceptance of the doctrine
nonetheless leaves the vast majority of DES victims without a cause of
action. The availability of Hymowitz in New York alone also detracts
from the usefulness of the national market and forces the American
public to absorb an increase in the cost of pharmaceuticals only to the
benefit of DES victims residing in New York State.
7.

Summary

Hymowitz is the apotheosis of market share liability;290 it embodies
Sindell's market share theory without being weighted down by unworkable standards, such as joining a substantial share of defendants, using
a local market to allocate liability, and attempting to approximate a
defendant's share of the actual harm suffered by a plaintiff. Hymowitz
actually is the only major market share decision modeled after Sindell
rather than a modified version of alternate liability.2"' Hymowitz likely
will have as great an impact on products liability in New York as did
2 92
Sindell in California.
Courts desiring to adopt a market share regime should model their
approaches after Hymowitz. The litigation following Sindell amply
demonstrates that insufficient local market information exists to approximate with much certainty or consistency a defendant's portion of
each plaintiff's injuries.2 9 Reliable information appears to be available
at the national level, 294 but the national market is too far removed from
the place of injury to be used as a basis for constructing a group of
defendants in each case that most likely harmed the plaintiff.
Hymowitz's overall risk approach is the most logical solution. Although
it will not yield accurate correlation between liability and actual causation of a single plaintiff's injuries, it will produce consistent verdicts
measured according to a defendant's contribution of risk to society.
This result is satisfactory because all DES manufacturers posed a uniformly unreasonable risk of harm to the public.
290.

See Partlett, supra note 265, at 1419.

291. See supra note 89.
292. Beyond the approximately 500 cases currently pending in New York, see supra note
210, Hymowitz likely will be applied to third-generation DES victims in the wake of Enright v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 155 A.D.2d 64, 553 N.Y.S.2d 494, 495 (1990) (permitting cause of action for a thirdgeneration DES victim who allegedly suffered birth defects because of her grandmother's exposure
to DES).
293. See supra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
294. See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
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B. Rejecting Market Share Liability for Vaccine-Related
Injuries:
29 5
Shackil v. Lederle Laboratories
In Shackil v. Lederle Laboratories Deanna Merrero's parents filed
a suit on her behalf against the doctor who had inoculated her with a
diptheria-pertussis-tetanus (DPT) vaccine and the drug manufacturer
believed to have produced the defective vaccine. 9 6 Because Merrero's
parents were ignorant of the connection between the vaccine and her
injuries, they did not bring suit until thirteen years after her inoculation.291 This delay rendered identification of the culpable manufacturer
virtually impossible because no records were kept documenting the
manufacturer of the DPT. 295 Thus, the plaintiff was forced to proceed
with a market share theory of causation. The trial court granted the
defendant's motion to dismiss because the plaintiff's inability to identify the defendant rendered her prima facie case incomplete.2 9 9 The

plaintiff's appeal produced three decisions.30 The New Jersey Supreme
Court reversed the holding of the lead opinion and held that a market
share theory of causation could not be used in claims arising from vaccine injuries. 301
The Shackil decision discussed whether DPT is a generic product
similar to DES. Unlike the uniform chemical composition of DES, DPT
is made from a biological formula, with only the pertussis component
producing harmful side effects. 3 02 Three different forms of the vaccine

exist, and each presents a different degree of harm. 03 Additionally, the
295. 116 N.J. 155, 561 A.2d 511 (1989).
296. Id. at 159, 561 A.2d at 513. The action alleged negligence, breach of warranty, misrepresentation, and strict liability based on a design defect. Id. Within hours of Deanna Merrero's inoculation at the age of two, she displayed symptoms of severe pain, which were followed by a rapid
deterioration in her health. The plaintiff lost her verbal, motor, and mental capacities. She became
severely retarded and required institutionalization. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 159-60, 561 A.2d at 513.
300., Id. at 160, 561 A.2d at 513. The lead opinion allowed the market share cause of action
because failure to do so" 'would be an unwarranted deviation from what we believe to be a course
already charted by the [New Jersey] Supreme Court."' Id. (quoting Shackil v. Lederle Laboratories, 219 N.J. Super. 601, 621, 530 A.2d 1287, 1297 (App. Div. 1987)).
301. See id. at 174-91, 561 A.2d at 521-29.
302. Id. at 174-75, 561 A.2d at 521. DPT consists of three components: Diphtheria toxoid,
tetanus toxoid, and a pertussis vaccine. The two toxoid portions contain small amounts of toxins
that are chemically treated to stimulate immunity without causing disease symptoms and, consequently, are not harmful. The pertussis portion, however, does produce harmful side-effects because it is made from a whole-cell preparation. Id. at 175, 561 A.2d at 521.
303. Id. In addition to the whole-cell preparation, two other methods are available: A splitcell method, which also was alleged to be designed defectively, and an acellular method predominantly used in Japan. Id. at 175-76, 561 A.2d at 521. The risks posed by the acellular method are
not known in the United States, but among the two former methods, certain drug companies produced versions significantly less harmful than others.
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biological composition of the vaccine can create defects within different
lots of the same type of vaccine.30 4 The court found, however, that doctors often use two of the vaccine types interchangeably, and one study
showed no notable variation in the number of serious reactions caused
by the different vaccine types.30 5 Consequently, the court would not reject market share liability solely because the products were based on a
somewhat varying biological formula, rather than a uniform chemical
compound.30 6
The New Jersey Supreme Court's main reservation about market
share liability in Shackil was the public policy considerations of expanding liability against the vaccine industry. The court noted that
vaccines are essential to public welfare.3 0 7 Recognizing that only two
manufacturers currently are willing to produce DPT,305 the court
stressed the need to prevent further escalation of prices caused by the
costs of litigation and liability insurance.3 0 9 Thus, the court concluded
that market share liability would not serve the public interest because
of its regressive effect on manufacturing DPT and the need to encourage vaccine research and development.3 1 0 Also central to the court's
holding was the enactment of the National Childhood Vaccine Injury
Act (NCVIA), which provides no-fault recovery for vaccine-related injuries or deaths.311 The court found the NCVIA critical to the outcome of
304. Id. at 176-77, 561 A.2d at 522.
305. See Shackil, 116 N.J. at 176, 561 A.2d at 522 (citing Boraff, Cody & Cherry, DPTAssociated Reactions: An Analysis by Injection Site, Manufacturers,PriorReactions and Dose,
73 J. PEDIATRICS 31 (Jan. 1984)).
306. Id. The court concluded that the difference in risks posed by the vaccines was not significant or conclusive enough to be dispositive of market share liability.
307. Id. at 178, 561 A.2d at 522. The court noted that the DPT vaccine is responsible for a
99% reduction in the occurrence of the pertussis disease, and that in countries where use of the
vaccine has been reduced, major epidemics have recurred. Id. at 178, 561 A.2d at 522-23.
308. Id. at 179, 561 A.2d at 523. In 1984 five companies produced DPT. Id.
309. Id. The court noted the rising price of a single DPT vaccination as evidence of these
costs. Compared to $.11 per dose in 1984, the vaccine cost $11.40 per dosage in 1986, $8.00 of
which goes to insurance fees. Id. In 1989 a single dose cost almost $15.00. Clayton & Hickson,
Compensation Under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, 116 J. PEDIATRIcs 508, 509
(1990).
310. Shackil, 116 N.J. at 188, 561 A.2d at 528. The court stated explicitly that continuing
DPT use is imperative, but that development of a safer alternative is even more important. The
court implied that these objectives were paramount to plaintiffs' needs for recovery.
311. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1 to 300aa-34 (1988).
Congress passed the NCVIA in 1986 in an effort to contain the vaccine problem, which endangered the continuation of widespread immunization. Clayton & Hickson, supra note 309, at 508-09.
Although it accomplishes significant tort reform, the NCVIA is not the exclusive remedy for vaccine-related injuries. Id. at 510. A claimant can elect to reject compensation under the NCVIA and
pursue a tort claim in state court. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-21(a). No civil action can be pursued, however, until the claimant exhausts the NCVIA's remedies. Id. § 300aa-11. If a claimant accepts
compensation under the NCVIA, no action can be brought against a manufacturer. Id. § 300aa21(a).
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the case because it provides certain, though reduced, compensation to
plaintiffs and encourages safer products by establishing a national vaccine research and development program.3 12 The court stated explicitly
that its holding rested on the public policy objective of fostering scientific and medical progress rather than on a flaw in market share liability. 1 ' The court expressly limited its holding to vaccine cases and
indicated a willingness to adopt market share liability in the appropriate factual context.3 14
VII. PUBLIC POLICY AND THE ROLE OF THE COURTS

A.

Limiting Market Share Liability

Although H3,mowitz represents considerable progress in the development of market share liability, Shackil is a substantial addition to
the line of cases limiting market share liability to the DES context."1 5
Market share liability is an innovative, yet controversial, doctrine
designed to overcome a peculiar set of facts: hundreds of defendants
manufactured and distributed a fungible and uniformly defective product that manifested a long latency period before causing injury, making
identification of the actual defendant nearly impossible."1 " These particular facts have not surfaced entirely with any other product.
Asbestos is similar to DES, but the variety of asbestos content in a
myriad of products renders apportionment of damages based on a deThe NCVIA's claims requirements demand substantially less proof than that needed for a
common-law tort action. Clayton & Hickson, supra note 309, at 510. If a claimant's injury is listed
on the Vaccine Injury Table, 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-14, the claimant must show. (1) that an injury
occurred, id. § 300aa-11(c)(1); (2) that resulted in damages, id. § 300aa-11(c)(1)(D)(i); and (3) that
a preponderance of evidence does not exist that the injury was caused other than by the vaccine.
Id. § 300aa-(13)(a). If the injury does not appear on the Injury Table, the claimant must show that
the vaccine actually caused the injury. Id. § 300aa-11(c)(1)(C)(ii)(I).
Damages are limited to actual and projected unreimbursed expenses, lost earnings, and a maximum of $250,000 for pain and suffering. Id. § 300aa-15(a). Attorney's fees are available, id. §
300aa-15(e), but punitive damages are quite limited. See id. § 300aa-23(d). For further commentary on the NCVIA, see Clayton & Hickson, supra note 309. See also Note, Vaccine Injuries-Federal Law Prescribes Procedures for Alternatives to Tort Actions for Vaccine-Related
Injuries, 11 U. Ar LITTLE RoCK L.J. 749 (1988-89); Comment, The National Childhood Vaccine
Injury Act of 1986: A Solution to the Vaccine Liability Crisis?, 63 WASH. L. REV. 149 (1988).
312. Shackil, 116 N.J. at 186, 561 A.2d at 527.
313. See id. at 188, 561 A.2d at 528. The court stated that "[r]ather than approach our decision from the perspective of an analytical criticism of the market-share approach, we have chosen
to posit today's ruling on the regressive effect that collective liability would have on the social
policy of encouraging vaccine production and research." Id.
314. Id. at 191, 561 A.2d at 529. Presumably this context would be DES litigation. Limiting
its holding to vaccines the court stated: "It should not be read as forecasting an inhospitable response to the theory of market share liability in an appropriate context. .. " Id.
315. See supra Part V.
316. See PRossER & KEETON, supra note 23, § 103, at 714 (listing four requirements of a
market share action).
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fendant's share of the complex asbestos market undesirable. 1 ' DPT
also shares common characteristics with DES, but is not uniformly defective, and currently only two manufacturers produce DPT. 18 The
Salk antipolio vaccine differs from DES in that the underlying design is
not defective and no latency period exists before injury. 1 9 More important, DPT and the Salk vaccine are valuable to the welfare of society.
Even further removed from the unique facts of DES are consumer and
industrial products such as car batteries and industrial dyes. The only
barrier to recovery in actions arising from these products is isolated instances of a plaintiff being unable to identify the defendant.32 0 The general theory of market share liability simply is not served in these cases.
Policy, as well as precedent, urges that market share liability be
confined to DES cases. The tort system never was intended to compensate every victim.3 21 A plaintiff first must prove that the defendant's

negligent conduct actually caused the plaintiff's injuries.2 2 A plaintiff
32 3
unable to make this showing alone must bear the cost of the injury.
One of the principal goals of the causation requirement is to limit
the reach of a defendant's potential liability.,24 Tort law must limit liability because excessive liability can discourage activities that are beneficial to society-"over-deterrence.

'3 2

5

In the case of DES, over-

deterrence is not a problem because the product has been forbidden for
use during pregnancy. 26 The vaccine crisis charted in Shackil, however,
demonstrates that even under traditional tort standards, with the cau3 27
sation requirement intact, socially desirable endeavors are at risk.
Market share liability's reduced causation requirements threaten the
very existence of products like DPT and possibly other generic drugs.
Thus, market share liability should not be extended beyond DES.
317. See supra subpart V(A).
318. See supra notes 302-10 and accompanying text.
319. See supra notes 165-73 and accompanying text.
320. See supra subpart V(C).
321. For example, a plaintiff cannot recover merely based on "[p]roof of negligence in the
air." Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
322. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 23, § 103, at 714; Fischer, supra note 46, at 1628.
323. Wright, supra note 23, at 1737 (citing O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 64 (M. Howe ed.
1963); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 236-37, 241 (4th ed. 1971)).
324. See Fischer, supra note 46, at 1629 (citing W. PROSSER,HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS
236.37 (4th ed. 1971)).
325. Id.
326. Id. at 1652.
327. As a further example, very few drug manufacturers today research and produce birth
control drugs. Podolsky & Roberts, Sorry, Not Sold in the U.S., U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Dec.
24, 1990, at 65 (reporting that currently only Ortho Pharmaceutical Corporation conducts contraceptive research and maintains a full line of contraceptive products, and that eight United States
firms cancelled research because of "[a]n avalanche of product-liability lawsuits in the mid-1980s
[that] drove liability premiums sky-high").
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B. Judicial Burden
Another cost of market share liability is the burden leveled on the
judiciary. In effect, market share liability is a judicial insurance plan
that strives to redistribute the cost of claims in rough accordance with a
manufacturer's share of the risk.328 Courts have neither the resources
nor the expertise, however, to manage a compensation fund involving
hundreds of claimants that requires extensive research and litigation to
establish who is entitled to the fund, how large the fund must be, and
how to distribute the cost of the fund.
Litigation is a notoriously slow and expensive means of compensation..29 The DES cases in New York are no exception;3 0 large-scale litigation gives rise to large-scale problems. Plaintiffs cannot agree on
uniform tactics or lead counsel to manage the trial on defendants' national market shares. Defendants also contribute to the delay by failing
to cooperate in determining their respective market shares. 3 1 Efforts
have been made to consolidate cases and employ mass litigation techniques, but the New York State courts and rules of civil procedure do
not lend themselves readily to mass litigation.332 To be sure, a slow and
costly resolution to the DES dilemma is better than no resolution at all.
A federal administrative remedy, however, would be more efficient and
would provide a better balance between compensation and competing
public policy concerns.
C. Legislative Alternative
A federally administered "National DES Recovery Act" modeled
after the NCVIA would resolve many of the problems posed by the various market share regimes. 3 Primarily, the cost of liability would be
328. Mulcahy v. Eli Lilly & Co., 386 N.W.2d 67, 76 (Iowa 1986) (characterizing market share
liability as a "kind of court-constructed insurance plan").
329. See, e.g., Kastemneier & Remington, CourtReform and Access to Justice: A Legislative
Perspective, 16 HARv. J. LEGIS. 301, 303 (1979) (stating that the "sad fact today is that the twin

demons of cost and delay are asphyxiating our courts, both state and federal").
330. See Rheingold, supra note 210, at 895-96 (describing various practical difficulties that
the New York courts are now facing with Hymowitz and 500 to 700 other market share cases).
331. See id. at 895 (counsel for Hymowitz reporting that "DES litigation is rather unruly in
terms of the cooperation of counsel").
332. See generally id.
333. Various legislative proposals to the problems caused by DES and market share liability
have been made over the years. The two most thorough proposals are found in Schwartz & Mahshigian, supra note 17, and Note, Market Share Liability: A Plea for Legislative Alternatives,

1982 U. ILL. L. REv. 1003. With the major impact of a case like Hymowitz, however, and the
NCVIA as a viable model, the cry for reform again must be sounded. Even manufacturers call for a
legislative solution. See Fine, A PersonalPerspectivefrom the "Manufacturer," 55 BRooKLYN L.
REv.899, 903 (1989). The Associate General Counsel for Johnson & Johnson, Inc. stated that the

"unusual circumstances of the DES scenario cry out for a simple straightforward legislative solu-

MARKET SHARE LIABILITY

1991]

437

distributed evenly throughout the industry."3 4 No solution can overcome the identification gap and link plaintiffs with their tortfeasors,
but a nationwide act would force all defendants to pay a portion of each
plaintiff's claim, which is consistent with the theory of market share
liability.33 5 A national remedy also would promise recovery for each
DES victim, not just those in the handful of states permitting market
share actions. Additionally, a streamlined recovery system properly
would devote more money to victims and less money to attorneys and
experts at a much quicker pace than litigation. Deterrence would be
achieved through a manufacturer-funded plan, 86 while a limit on the
amount of damages available would guard against over-deterrence of
other generic products.3

7

Finally, administration of the fund by a con-

gressional committee would relieve the state courts of a substantial,
costly burden.
Under the plan manufacturers would contribute to a central fund
in proportion to their national market share of DES as determined by a
congressional committee. One proposal has suggested that manufacturers' efforts in responding to lawsuits and manufacturers' degree of culpability also should be considered when determining responsibility for
funding.338 Like the NCVIA, Congress should appoint special masters to
administer the fund to ensure expeditious recovery. 3 Unlike the
NCVIA, however, the plan should be the exclusive remedy for plaintiffs,
and recovery should be available only for those DES victims unable to
identify the manufacturer after reasonable efforts. 4 °
Congress would have to give special consideration to claims that
are stale under state law and would have to provide a time frame to
establish who is eligible for recovery. Obviously, plaintiffs who already
have brought suit in jurisdictions permitting market share liability
would be ineligible. A list of the most widely accepted DES-related injuries could constitute the "DES Injury Table," as was done in the
NCVIA.3

41

Requirements for claims also could be established in a man-

ner similar to the NCVIA. A plaintiff whose injury appears on the Intion, a fund administered by a government agency." Id.
334. See Schwartz & Mahshigian, supra note 17, at 970.
335. See Fischer, supra note 46, at 1626.
336. Schwartz & Mahshigian, supra note 17, at 970-71.
337. See Fischer, supra note 46, at 1652.
338. Schwartz & Mahshigian, supra note 17, at 971. The proposal, however, does not elaborate on what "manufacturer culpability" should include.
339. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(c), (d) (1988).
340. Schwartz & Mahshigian, supra note 17, at 967. Victor Schwartz and Liberty Mahshigian
point out the possible need to create a penalty for plaintiffs who falsely identify the manufacturer
in an effort to avoid compensation under the plan in favor of a higher award in state court. Id.
341. See supra note 311.
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jury Table and cannot identify the defendant would have to show: (1)
exposure to DES; (2) injury; (3) damages; and (4) that the injury was
not caused by something other than DES. 42 Plaintiffs whose injuries do
not appear on the list should be required to prove all causal elements of
a tort action except for identification.3 4" Plaintiffs' damages should be
limited to actual damages with a limited amount for pain and suffering,
perhaps between $100,000 and $250,000. The fund should provide attorney's fees for plaintiffs and defendants. To facilitate its enactment, the
act should cover DES victims only, as opposed to a general toxic tort
recovery plan, and punitive damages should be prohibited.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

For the past ten years, market share liability has been the sole recourse for DES plaintiffs who cannot identify precisely the DES manufacturer that caused their harm. Market share liability, however, has
not resolved the DES problem adequately. Reflecting judicial reluctance to accept the radical change in tort law that the doctrine
presents, only a handful of states have adopted market share liability in
place of traditional causation requirements. Thus, the majority of DES
victims are without any hope of recovery. Even in states that have
adopted the doctrine, attempts to apportion damages in a rational, consistent manner have been impeded by the paucity of market share
information.
Hymowitz represents New York's attempt to respond to the needs
of its DES victims. The decision is also noteworthy for its consistent
apportionment of damages based on manufacturers' contribution to the
overall risk. Hymowitz, however, is hardly a panacea in that its costly
and time-consuming procedures impose substantial burdens on the litigants and the judiciary.
This Note has sought to demonstrate that the judiciary, while better than no alternative, is not the optimal place for processing the
claims and distributing the costs incumbent with a market share liability approach. Realistically, litigants cannot be expected to engage in a
cooperative effort to determine damage entitlements and apportionment of liability. Prior to Hymowitz, each new case presented a new
controversy over market shares and liability. A comprehensive plan
from the legislature could eliminate much of this duplicative process by
342.

See id.

343. Schwartz and Mahshigian propose that all plaintiffs who are unable to identify the defendant should be required to make this showing. Schwartz & Mahshigian, supra note 17, at 967.
Such a requirement seems unnecessary if a reliable Injury Table can be compiled and would add
substantially to the cost and delay of claims.
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establishing one set of concrete rules to handle all cases, with little contention. The legislature has the resources to create and implement such
a plan and to strike a balance between the competing policy concerns
that arise from a relaxed showing of causation.
The NCVIA is a viable model for legislation that can address the
concerns of both the litigants and society in achieving an acceptable
resolution to DES injuries. An administrative remedy will offer plaintiffs quick, certain recovery, while guaranteeing limited liability for defendants. Such a plan also would provide society with an efficient use of
resources. Thus, Congress should take heed of the DES cases and respond decisively with a legislative solution.
Andrew B. Nace*

* The Author thanks Professor David F. Partlett for his helpful comments on this Note.

